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In 1983 Wyoming adopted the 1972 amendments to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In this article, the author examines many of
the Important provisions of the amendments. Interesting and difficult
amendments are explored, and the Impact of the amendments on WyomIng law Is discussed.

WYOMING ADOPTS THE "1972
AMENDMENTS" TO UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9THE REVISIONS AND SOME
CONTINUING PROBLEMS*
Jack Van Baalen**

Wyoming adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (the "Code") in 1961.
Promulgated jointly by The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the Code purports to
deal with all aspects of a commercial transaction. 1 Article 9 of the Code,
which addresses secured transactions in personal property, was an innovative integration of the badly fragmented field of chattel security.
Although this integration was highly successful, shortcomings did emerge
which required some revisions. 2 Proposed amendments to Article 9 were
therefore promulgated in 1972. At the time of preparation of this article,
*The research for this article was partially supported by the Amax Foundation, through a
faculty summer research grant, for which the author is grateful.
**Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. The author expresses his appreciation of the
assistance of Stephenson D. Emery in the preparation of this article.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, GENERAL COMMENT OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 2 (1962).
2. See PERMANENT

EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW

COMMITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 195

(1971).
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thirty-nine jurisdictions had adopted the 1972 amendments. Wyoming
adopted them in 1983, effective July 1, 1983.8
Perusal of the amendments, as well as the Review Committee's comments on its work, 4 suggests that the revisions are extensive. While many
revisions were made, most were intended to clarify the meaning of Code
provisions, not to change their substance. 5 Recognizing that adoption of
the Official amendments by all jurisdictions would be a lengthy process, the
Committee sought to minimize changes in an effort to preserve uniformity
during the interim. 6 It "eschewed amendment merely for the sake of
theoretical improvement," and instead recommended revision only when
jurisdictions or when
nonuniform amendments had been made by adopting
7
it had received substantial demands for change.
The principal purpose of this article is to review those amendments
which I consider significant or otherwise interesting. Readers may
disagree. While the review is fairly comprehensive, no attempt is made to
refer to every revision. Stylistic and conforming revisions, as well as some
substantive ones, are not mentioned. Furthermore, statutory provisions
are often paraphrased or extracted for convenience of discussion. I
therefore urge reference to the complete and original statutory language.
In the belief that priorities between conflicting claims to collateral and
perfection of security interests are of prime importance, discussion of
amendments affecting these predominate. Separate sections of the article
devoted to multi-state problems, proceeds, fixtures and the peculiar Wyoming treatment of motor vehicles deal largely with considerations of priority
3. The version of the Official Code adopted by the Wyoming legislature in 1961 was the
1958 Official Text. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, REPORT No. 1 at 2 (1962), republishedin R. BRAUCHER & J. SUTHERLAND, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, SELECTED STATUTES XX (1968). References in this article are to
the 1962 Official Text, the version revised by the 1972 amendments. See PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT 196 (1971).
The 1958 Official Text adopted by Wyoming is virtually the same as the 1962 official text.
In this article the term "Code" designates both the 1962 Official Uniform Commercial Code and the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in 1961 and amended
prior to 1983. Wyoming adopted the 1958 Official Code with few changes. The term
"amendments" designates both the Official amendments proposed in 1972 and the
Wyoming amendments adopted in 1983. Again, Wyoming adopted the 1972 Official
amendments with few changes. When only the "Official Code" or "Official amendments"
are discused, they are called by those names and when only the "Wyoming Code" or
"Wyoming amendments" are discussed, they are called by those names. The Official
Code is cited to U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1962); the Official amendments to U.C.C. §§
9-101 to 11-108 (1972); the Wyoming Code to Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-101 to 34-21-1002
(1977); and the Wyoming amendments to Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-901 to 34-21-966 (Supp.
1983).
4. The task of preparing the Official amendments was delegated to the Uniform Commercial
Code Review Committee (Review Committee). In addition to the amendments, it
prepared two Preliminary Reports and a Final Report, as well as section by section
reasons for the changes. The reports are entitled Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, Preliminary Draft No. 1 (1968) (Draft No. 1), Preliminary Draft No. 2 (1970) (Draft
No. 2) and Final Report (1971) (Final Report). The reasons for the changes appear following each section in the Official amendments (Reasons for 1972 Change). They should not
be confused with the Official Comments pertaining to the Official Code as amended by
the Official amendments. These follow each section of the Official Code as amended.
5. See U.C.C. § 11-108 (1972).
6. See Final Report, supra note 4, at 195-96.
7. Id.
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and perfection as they apply to these specific areas. I must here confess
that the section of the article discussing Wyoming motor vehicle security
interests may be parading under false colors. In large part it explores questions raised by provisions injected into the Wyoming Code twenty years
before the adoption of the Wyoming amendments. 8 Nonetheless some airing of these questions seems desirable.

PRIORITY CONFLICTS

One of the principal purposes for which a secured party obtains a
security interest is to assure priority of payment of his claim from the proceeds of sale of the collateral. Borrower grants Lender a security interest
in all of Borrower's equipment to secure repayment of a loan. By granting
the security interest Borrower agrees with Lender that, if Borrower fails
to repay the loan, Lender may sell the equipment and apply the proceeds to
repayment of the loan. Equally important, Lender must be certain that no
one else has or can acquire a claim to the equipment which will be superior
to Lender's rights. Claims to the equipment which conflict with Lender's
rights might arise in many ways. These include levy of execution by a lien
creditor, 9 purchase of equipment from Borrower, Borrower's grant of
other security interests in the equipment and others. 10 If Lender is relying
on the equipment as a source of repayment, he must determine whether his
rights will have priority over these possible conflicting claimants. In most
cases priority of the security interest dates from Lender's filing of a financing statement or taking possession of the collateral. Usually filing or
possession will effect "perfection" of the interest. Part 3 of Article 9 contains the rules governing priority conflicts." The amendments affect some
provisions relating to conflicts between a secured party and these other
claimants.
8. The peculiar motor vehicle provisions of the Wyoming Code were first adopted in 1963.
See 1963 Wyo. SEss. LAws Ch. 185, § 2. The definition of "vehicle or motor vehicle re'red to be licensed," "vehicle" and "motor vehicle" was added in 1969. See 1969 Wyo.
EsS. LAws Ch. 63, § 1. For the discussion of Wyoming motor vehicle security interests,
see infra text accompanying notes 147-92.
9. "A 'lien creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for the benefit of creditors from the
time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition
or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment." Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-930(c) (1977 &
Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1962 & 1972)).
10. Conflicts may also arise between a security interest and other lien claims, such as governmental tax liens and possessory liens. The priority of Federal tax liens is dealt with inferentialiy by Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-930(d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972)). See infra text accompanying notes 34-37. Most possessory liens are accorded priority by Wyo.
STAT. § 34-21-939 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-310 (1962 & 1972)). Sections of the Wyoming
Statutes Annotated which were not revised by the amendments were not reprinted in the
1983 supplement. For this reason no citation to the supplement appears for unrevised
sections.
11. Part 2 of Article 9 contains the basic priority rule: Except as otherwise provided by this
Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-920 (1977) (U.C.C.
§ 9-201 (1962 & 1972)). Part 3 must be consulted to determine when the Act does otherwise provide.
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Security Interest v. Lien Creditor and Some Transferees or Buyers
As a general rule a perfected security interest takes priority over the
rights of a lien creditor who obtains his lien after perfection and an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor.
Under the Code, however, the rights of a lien creditor were also subordinate to an unperfected security interest unless the creditor had no
knowledge of the security interest when he obtained the lien.' 2 A representative lien creditor (assignee for benefit of creditors, trustee in bankruptcy,
or receiver in equity), however, was deemed to be without knowledge so
long as any creditor represented was innocent of the existing security interest. The condition that a lien creditor (or his representative) seeking
priority over a security interest be innocent of its existence was inconsistent with the Code's treatment of priority conflicts between two secured
parties. In the latter case priority was governed solely by the time of filing
or perfection by other means. One secured party's knowledge of another's
unfiled or unperfected security interest was irrelevant. 5 The amendments
reconcile the treatment of lien creditors with that of secured parties by
deleting the knowledge limitation upon lien creditors. Although the change
may be of come practical significance with respect to an individual lien
creditor, its practical application in most cases is of doubtful importance. It
is likely that the provision's principle utility lies in avoidance of unperfected
security interests by a trustee in bankruptcy. 14 It would be a rare case indeed in which the secured party could establish that all creditors knew of
his unperfected
security interest at the time when a bankruptcy petition
15
was filed.
Two other provisions of the Code subordinated the unperfected security interest to the rights of certain classes of transferees or buyers.' 6 Like
the provision respecting lien creditors, these provisions also required that
the protected transferees or buyers take the collateral without knowledge
of the security interest. Apparently because no dissatisfaction with these
provisions had been expressed to the Review Committee, they were not
12. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-930(a) (ii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b) (1962)).
13. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(e) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1962)).
14. The trustee, relying on his position as a hypothetical lien creditor, may utilize U.C.C. §
9-301(1) (h) to avoid an unperfected security interest. See 11 U.C.C. § 544(a) (1) (1982).
15. For a case in which the secured party attempted to establish that all creditors had
knowledge of the security interest, see In re Komfo Products Corp., 247 F. Supp. 229
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
16. The first of these provisions subordinated the unperfected security interest to a
transferee in bulk or a buyer not in ordinary course of business of goods, instruments,
documents and chattel paper to the extent that he gave value and received delivery of the
collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected. WYo.
STAT. § 34-21-930(a) (iii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (c) (1962)). The amendments add to this
group buyers of farm products in the ordinary course of business. Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-930 (a) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (cX1972)). These buyers are expressly
excluded from the benefits of section 9-307(1) which protects other buyers in the ordinary
course. Presumably failure of the Code to grant these farm products buyers express protection against unperfected security interests was an oversight. See J. WHITE AND R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ed. 1980) [hereinafter referred to as J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS].

1033 (2d

The second provision subordinates the unperfected security interest to a transferee
of accounts, contract rights and general intangibles to the extent that he gives value
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-930(a) (iv) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (d) (1962)).
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revised in 1972 to delete the requirement that the transferee or buyer take
the collateral without knowledge. 17 There appears to be little, if any, basis
for distinguishing between lien creditors and these other types of
transferees or buyers with respect to the requirement that they acquire
their interest without knowledge of the unperfected security interest. One
might question on moral grounds the behavior of any person who acquires
an interest in property knowing that this action might interfere with the interest of another. Presumably, the Code drafters opted for a pure race to
the record, making knowledge irrelevant, to avoid litigation of possibly difficult disputes over whether a party had knowledge of an unperfected
security interest. This rationale applies with equal force to creditors and
these other types of transferees and buyers.
The only apparent distinction between a lien creditor and these
transferees or buyers arises from the likelihood that the creditor will have
advanced credit sometime prior to obtaining his lien in the collateral while
transferees or buyers ordinarily give value contemporaneously with, or
after, transfer of the collateral to them. In the event that, in the course of
attempting to recover payment, a creditor learned of the unperfected
security interest, his subsequently acquired judgment lien would be subordinated if knowledge of that interest precluded him from obtaining priority. 18 This possibility would support a limited distinction between lien
creditors and these transferees or buyers. Knowledge of a member of the
latter group would be determined as of or prior to the time he gave value.
Comparable treatment of the lien creditor's lien would require that his lien
be subordinated only if he knew of an unperfected security interest when he
advanced credit; knowledge of that interest when the lien was later obtained should be irrelevant. 19 As indicated, however, the amendments go
beyond this limited distinction, making the lien creditor's knowledge irrelevant even at the time credit is advanced. This seems justified only by the
desirability of avoiding litigation of disputes over possible knowledge. If
this is the rationale, consistency and logic require deletion of the
knowledge limitation in the cases of these transferees or buyers. The
drafters' desire to minimize change does not seem an adequate justification
for the differing treatment.
One revision of the provision which protects transferees and buyers
against unperfected security interests may be of significance to Wyoming
practitioners. This revision expressly subordinates an unperfected security
interest to the rights of a buyer of farm products 20 in the ordinary course of
business. Buyers in the ordinary course of business of all products, except
farm products, take free from even a perfected security interest. 21 Having
17. Draft No. 2, supranote 4, at 35.
18. See U.C.C. § 9-301, Reasons for 1972 Change.
19. At a preliminary stage of the redrafting process, this treatment of lien creditor
knowledge was recommended by the Review Committee. Draft No. 2, supranote 4, at 34.
20. "Goods are ... (3) 'farm products' if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if
they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other
farming operations. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor
inventory., WYo. STAT. § 34-21-909(a) (iii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1962)).
21. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-936(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1962)).
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excluded the ordinary course farm products buyer from protection against
perfected security interests, the Code did not expressly protect him against
an unperfected security interest. Those buyers might, therefore, have been
subordinated to the unperfected as well as the perfected security interest.
This result could not have been intended because buyers of farm products
not in ordinary course were protected against an unperfected interest.
There could be no reason for according the ordinary course buyer less
favorable treatment than the non-ordinary course buyer. The amendments
rectify what was undoubtedly a drafters' oversight, clearly granting the
22
protection intended.
Security Interest v. Intervening Buyer or Lien Creditor(InternalRevenue

Service)
A security agreement may provide that the secured party will make
more than one loan or advance of credit to the debtor.23 The Code
designates additional loans and advances made after the first one as future
advances.2 4 The making of a future advance may either be voluntary or pursuant to a contractual commitment.2 5 In either case, when a secured party
make future advances, priority disputes may arise between the secured
party and a person buying or obtaining a lien upon the collateral in the interim between the original advance and the future advances. The Code contained no express provisions governing priorities in these cases. Absent
such provisions the secured party might be accorded priority by the general
rule that security agreements are effective against purchasers of collateral
and creditors.2 6 The secured party could then make future advances
secured by collateral even though he knew that it had been sold or that a
creditor had acquired a lien against it.27 In this event the buyer or lien
creditor would be denied the benefit of any equity in the collateral which
22. The freedom from prior security interests accorded ordinary course buyers was withheld
from ordinary course buyers of farm products because of a contest between highly
organized economic interests-farm lenders against processors of farm products. The
permanent Editorial Board for the Official Code chose not to assist the processors against
the lenders. No reason was perceived, however, to continue the possible subordination of
ordinary course farm buyers to unperfected security interests. PROCEEDINGS OF THE
48TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 328 (1971).
23. Security agreement provision for future advances is expressly authorized. Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-923(e) (1977) and (c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-204(5) (1962) and (3) (1972)).
24. The Code does not define the term "future advances," but it appears to contemplate
those made some time after the first advance under the security agreement. See Wyo.
STAT. § 34-21-941(g) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1972)).
25. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-905 (a) (xi) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (k) (1972)). Definition
and use of the term "pursuant to commitment" were added to the Code by the
amendments.
26. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-920 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-201 (1962)).
27. It has been argued that a security interest securing a future advance should never take.
priority over an intervening lien because a security interest is not perfected until value is
given. Value has not been given until the future advance is made, after the lien arises. See
Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-932(a) and 923(a) (1977) (U.C.C. §§ 9-303(1), 9-204(1) (1962)). If
future advances are limited to those following an earlier advance under the same security
agreement, however, it can be said that value is given, and the security interest
perfected, at the time of the earlier advance. It would, therefore, take priority over the
intervening lien. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.6
(1965). The same analysis could be applied to priority of future advances over a buyer of
collateral.
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had existed at the time of purchase or acquisition of a lien.28 The Review
Committee considered unfair the possibility that, by arranging for an additional advance, a debtor and secured party
might knowingly "squeeze out"
29
the interest of a buyer or lien creditor.
Under the amendments all buyers of collateral take free from a security
interest securing any future advance made after they buy the collateral
unless that advance is made or pursuant to a commitment made (1) while
the secured party has no knowledge of the purchase and (2) before fortyfive days after the purchase. 80 The buyer is not protected against the
unpleasant consequences of purchasing collateral which is subject to a
security interest securing preexisting advances. 8 ' He is, however, protected against post-purchase increases in the amount of the security interest to which the collateral is subject, except those advances to the
limited extent provided. The amendments do accord priority to a future advance made after a secured party learns of buyer's purchase of the collateral if that advance is pursuant to a prior commitment 2 given before expiration of the forty-five-day period and without knowledge of the purchase. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that a security agreement would require such advances or that the secured party would voluntarily make
them. 83
As one might expect the future advance provisions governing priority
conflicts between a secured party and a lien creditor are similar to those
just discussed relating to protection of buyers. The lien creditor's rights in
collateral are subject to a security interest securing advances made before
he acquires his lien and to those made within forty-five days thereafter, or
made without knowledge of the lien, or made pursuant to a commitment
28. Professor Grant Gilmore suggested that a lien creditor is not injured by the future advance since the reduction in the equity in the collateral is offset by the amount of the advance to the debtor. 2 G. GILMORE, supranote 27, § 35.6 (1965). This analysis would not
apply to a buyer of collateral who wishes to retain the specific property and has no
satisfactory recourse to the debtor's other assets. Furthermore, while theoretically correct, the Gilmore analysis may not always be practically sufficient. By definition, the lien
creditor holds a lien on the property subject to the security interest. He may not hold a
lien on the property (often cash) transferred to the debtor in exchange for the security
interest.
29. U.C.C. § 9-312, Reasons for 1972 Change, para. 5.
30. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-936(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1972)).
31. The unpleasant consequences are not as pervasive as they might initially appear. Buyers
in the ordinary course of business (WYo. STAT. § 34-21-120(a) (ix) (1977) (U.C.C. §
1-201(9) (1962)) take free of any security interests created by their sellers. WYo. STAT. §
34-21-936(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1962)). Consumer buyers of consumer goods take
free of any security interest if (1) they have no knowledge of the interest and (2) it is not
perfected by filing. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-936(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-307(2) (1962)). Most
security interests in consumer goods are probably not perfected by filing. See WYo. STAT.
§ 34-21-931(a) (iv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d) (1972)).
32. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-936(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 307(3) (1972)). An advance is made pursuant to commitment "if the secured party has bound himself to make it, whether or not a
subsequent event of default or other event not within his control has relieved or may
relieve him from his obligation."
33. The assumed sale would necessarily constitute a violation of the security agreement
since, if it is authorized, the security interest in the sold collateral expires upon sale.
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972)). But see Matto's Inc. v.
Olde Colony Place, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1750 (Bankr. ED Mich. 1981) holding that a
security interest continued after an authorized sale.
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given without knowledge of the lien. 3 4 Two crucial differences exist between the provision protecting lien creditors and the one just discussed
which protects buyers. First, advances by the secured party during the
forty-five-day period take priority over the lien regardless of the secured
party's knowledge. Second, advances made after the forty-five-day period
also take priority so long as they are made without knowledge of the lien.
The absolute priority for forty-five days regardless of knowledge was
thought necessary to preserve the priority of future advances over intervening federal tax liens on the collateral.3 5 The Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966 grants security interests priority over federal tax liens in certain
kinds of property. This priority is limited to the extent that the security interest "is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of
the time of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation." 6 Before adoption of the Code most states granted priority to optional advances by
secured parties only if they were made without knowledge of the intervening lien. The Tax Lien Act, however, is unclear respecting whether the
secured party contemplated by its reference to local law is charged with
knowledge of the lien or not.3 7 To assure future advances limited priority
over intervening federal tax liens, therefore, the amendments make clear
that the advance made within forty-five days after the lien arises has priority over an intervening lien creditor regardless of the secured party's
knowledge of the lien.
The second difference between the lien creditor and the buyer future
advance provisions pertains to the priority of a future advance made
without knowledge after the forty-five-day period. A future advance made
without knowledge at any time after an intervening lien arises takes priority over the lien creditor. By contrast, only a future advance made both
without knowledge and during the forty-five-day period takes priority over
an intervening buyer. The Review Committee did not comment publicly on
the reasons for this difference. Ordinarily, however, the lien creditor does
not specifically rely on the collateral at the time of making his advance
while the buyer clearly does. This difference between lien creditors and
buyers might motivate more solicitous treatment for buyers. Another explanation of the differing treatment may be that the future advance does
not injure the lien creditor as much as it injures the buyer.3 8
One might wonder why the drafters apply a knowledge standard to
conflicts between security interests and buyers or lien creditors when the
current trend seems to reject knowledge in favor of a pure race standard
elsewhere. Note, however, that the pure race standard governs when both
parties are secured creditors who are directly part of the system governed
by the UCC or when knowledge of the lien creditor, who is not part of the
system, would otherwise deny him priority over an unperfected security
34. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-930(d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972)).
35. U.C.C. § 9-301, Reasons for 1972 Change. "Lien creditor" includes the Internal Revenue
Service asserting a tax lien. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1972) (WYO. STAT. § 34-21430(c)
(Supp. 1983)).
36. FEDERAL TAX LiEN AcT OF 1966, § 6323(c) and (d).
37. Coogan, The Effect of the FederalTax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1401 (1968).
38. See upra note 28.
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interest. In these latter instances, the undesirability of litigating disputes
over possible knowledge of the intervening secured party or lien creditor
supports use of the pure race standard. In the future advance conflict the
relevant knowledge is the knowledge of a secured party respecting purchase or lien by other parties who are not a direct part of the Code system.
Fairness to these other parties outweighs the undesirability of permitting
inquiry into the secured party's knowledge. The only exception accords the
secured party with knowledge of a lien a short period (forty-five days) after
that lien arises within which to make additional advances, or commitments
for advances, secured by the collateral. This exception assures priority to
future advances made within forty-five days after a federal tax lien arises.
Secured Partyv. Secured Party (General Conflicts)
Perhaps the principal priority conflicts governed by the Code are those
arising between two security interests in the same collateral. The general
approach to these priority conflicts appears in section 9-312(5).19 The
essence of this provision is that the first secured party to file a financing
statement, or otherwise perfect his security interest, takes priority over
any conflicting security interest in the same collateral. Before considering
revisions in the general priority provision, however, it will be useful to
focus briefly on a major exception.
In the case of purchase money security interests 40 which comply with
section 9-312(3) or (4) the general priority rule is reversed; the second to file
a financing statement, or otherwise perfect, takes priority. 41 The Code
treats separately purchase money security interests in inventory (governed
by 9-312(3)) and those in collateral other than inventory (governed by
9-312(4)). The two subsections differ markedly in the requirements
specified for obtaining priority over a conflicting security interest. Subsection (4) simply requires that the purchase money security interest be
perfected within twenty days after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral. 42 By contrast, subsecton (3) requires both perfection at the time
that the debtor receives the inventory and also notification to other parties
holding a security interest in the same types of inventory. The need for
notice with respect to inventory collateral is that, unlike financing arrangements based on other collateral, inventory financing arrangements
typically require the secured party to make advances against incoming inventory or release of old inventory as new inventory is received. Notice
39. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-941(e) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1962)).
40. A purchase money security interest is one retained by a seller to secure payment of the
purchase price or one granted to a lender to secure repayment of a loan made to acquire
rights in the collateral. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-907 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972)).
41. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(c) and (d) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-312(3) and (4) (1962)). Some additional exceptions to the general priority rule also exist. Most purchase money security interests in consumer goods (U.C.C. § 9-109(1)) may be perfected without filing a financing
statement or taking possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d). Moreover, under
some circumstances, temporary perfection (for 21 days) of a security interest in instruments or negotiable documents is authorized without filing or possession.
42. The Official Code and amendments require perfection within 10 days after debtor's
receipt of the collateral. Wyoming increased the perfection period to 20 days in 1981.
1981 WYO. SEss. LAWS ch. 103, § 1. Furthermore, section 9-301(2) grants purchase
money security interests priority over intervening lien creditors if a financing statement
is filed within 10 days of debtor's receipt of the collateral. Wyoming has also increased
this period to 20 days. Id. Therefore this article will refer to the 20-day period.
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enables the earlier secured party to withhold advances against inventory
subject 4to
a subsequent purchase money security interest which has
8
priority.
Questions which arose respecting the subsection (3) notice requirements have been resolved by the amendments. The Code apparently
permitted oral notification. The amendments require "notification in
writing." The Code was silent respecting the required frequency of
notification if more than one purchase money advance was contemplated.
The amendments require notice only once during a five-year period. 44 The
Code required notification of secured parties known to the purchase money
secured party whether or not that secured party had filed a financing statement. The amendments require notice only to those secured parties who
have filed. The change is consistent with the race to the record philosophy
of avoiding disputes respecting whether, at the time of filing,
a secured
45
party had knowledge of another, unfiled security interest.
Additional revisions which affect both subsections (3) and (4) concern
the purchase money secured party's interest in proceeds of the collateral.
The Code omitted any reference to proceeds interests in either subsection,
with the result that a secured party could obtain a security interest in proceeds. 46 The amendments expressly confirm this result with respect to
subsection (4) security interests in collateral other than inventory; in these
cases the secured party does not normally anticipate debtor's sale of the
collateral. 41 Conversely, with respect to subsection (3) security interests in
inventory, the purchase money secured party retains a security interest
only in identifiable cash proceeds received by the debtor on or before
delivery of goods to the buyer. Here it is expected that the inventory will be
sold, ordinarily producing accounts or similar
proceeds which may
48
themselves constitute the basis for financing.
And now, back to the general first to file or perfect rule. Under the
Code problems arose respecting the precise nature and extent of the priority that resulted from this general rule. Assume that First secured party
files a financing statement sometime before making any advance to the
debtor. Under the first to file rule, First should be secure in the knowledge
that an advance made at any time after filing would take priority over an
advance that might be made by Second secured party between the time of
First's filing and First's advance. Unfortunately, the Code's rule operated
only when both First's and Second's security interests were perfected by
the filing. 49 If, when he made his intervening advance, Second perfected his
security interest by taking possession of the collateral, 0 instead of filing,
priority followed first perfection rather than first filing. First's security
43. U.C.C. § 9-312, Official Comment, para. 3 (1972).
44. The 5-year period was chosen by analogy to the duration for which a financing statement
is effective. U.C.C. § 9-312, Reasons for 1972 Change, para. 2(a).
45. See supratext following note 17.
46. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-922(a) (ii) and 34-21-935(b) (1977) (U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1) (b) and

9-306(2) (1962)).

47. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 3 (1972).
48. Id.
49. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(e) (1)(1977) (U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (a) (1962)).
50. Security interests in collateral other than accounts and general intangibles may be
perfected by possession. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-934 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-305 (1962)).
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interest could not be perfected until he gave value, at the time his loan was
made. 51 Second, having given value before First gave value, had the first
perfected security interest and, therefore, priority.
This result seemed to be clearly dictated by the Code 52 and one might
ask what difference it makes who takes priority as long as the parties'
relative priorities are clearly specified. First can protect himself by verifying that the debtor has possession of the collateral when First's advance is
made.55 The difficulty is that the Code is intended to adopt a notice filing
system. Once First has verified the debtor's possession of the collateral,
checked the financing statement file for prior filings and filed with respect
54
to collateral, he should thereafter be secure in his first priority position.
By adopting a bifurcated rule, one for cases in which both interests are
perfected by filing and another for all other cases, the Code breached the
fortress of his security. The amendments reverse the priority in the above
example of a security interest perfected by possession intervening between
filing and the perfection of another security interest.55 The amended
9-312(5) replaces the Code's bifurcated rule with a unified priority rule,
granting priority to the first to file a financing statement or perfect. It
places the burden on Second to check the financing statement file before
lending, as a prudent lender should, and frees First from the duplicative
burden of verifying debtor's possession of the collateral both when First
files and when it later lends.
Perhaps the most vexing problem to besmirch the Code's first to file
scheme pertained to the priority of future advances by a secured party
whose security agreement omitted a clause providing for possible future
advances. Here the problem arose when Second's security interest intervened between First's initial advance and a subsequent advance made
by him. First obtained a security interest, filed a financing statement and
loaned to debtor on March 1. First's security agreement omitted any mention of possible future advances, perhaps none were anticipated. Second obtained a non-purchase money security interest in the same collateral and
loaned to debtor on April 1 (April fool). First made an additional loan to
debtor on May 1. First's March 1 loan took priority over Second's April 1
loan because both perfected by filing and First filed first. But did First's
May 1 loan take priority over Second's April 1 loan? The much discussed
case of Coin-O-Matic Service Co. v. Rhode IslandHospitalTrust Co. 56 held
that, absent a future advance clause in the first security agreement, the second loan made by the first lender did not take priority over an intervening
loan made by a second lender. 57 The decision was motivated by the court's
51. It is a prerequisite of perfection that the security interest has attached. WYo. STAT. §
34-21-932(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1962)). The security interest cannot attach until
value is given. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-923(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962)).
52. The Review Committee believed the result to be debatable. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Reasons
for 1972 Change, para. 5.
53. The rules governing secured transactions are made for professional financers who are
assumed to be knowledgeable.
54. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 5 (1972).
55. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972)).
56. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1112 (R.I. Super. 1966).
57. In Coin-O-Matic the first financing statement was terminated and a new one filed when
the second loan was made. The court did not base its holding on this ground, nor should
this fact be crucial. Notice of the first lender's security interest in the collateral was
available to the intervening lender when his loan was made. There was no indication that
the second lender communicated with the first to determine if future advances might be
made.
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concern that a first financer could tie up assets of the debtor, thereby
precluding him from obtaining future financing from anyone else. 58 The
holding is curious in view of the fact that a lender who filed but made no
loan until after the intervening loan was made would clearly prevail.
Nothing in the Code's first to file rule seemed to require a different result
simply because an earlier loan was made. Moreover, the provision approving authorization of future advances in a security agreement 59 was clearly
permissive; it did not condition the lender's rights on the existence of a
future advance clause in the agreement. Other courts have accorded priority to the future advance on facts similar to those in Coin-O-Matic.60
The amendments add a new subsection (7) to section 9-312 to clarify the
priority of future advances."1 Under this provision the priority of a future
advance made while a security interest is perfected is the same as the
priority of the first advance. One might assert that the Coin-O-Maticresult
could still be reached under this provision because, by using the term
"future advances," subsection (7) refers to advances provided for in the
original security agreement, as authorized by the statute. 62 That this was
not the drafters' intent is established by the Official Comments.63
In drafting subsection (7) to clarify the intended priority of future advances, the drafters may have inadvertently created a new problem. The
subsection limits its protection to future advances made while a security interest is perfected by filing or possession. Under the amendments, as under
the Code, one prerequisite to perfection is that "value has been given" by
the secured party. 64 The provision causes no difficulty as applied to the
above example of the First and Second secured parties because, by making
the first loan, First has given value. If, however, the hypothetical facts are
varied to assume that First's first loan, made on March 1, is repaid in full
before his May 1 loan is made, an interpretive question arises. Is First's second loan (the future advance) made "while [its] security interest is
perfected?" First's security interest was perfected when it made the first
loan. Did it cease to be perfected when that loan was repaid? If so, was the
second loan (the future advance), advanced while there was no value given
by First which remained in the debtor's hands, made while the security
interest was not perfected?
58. This rationale has been branded fallacious for at least two reasons. First, the alleged protection afforded a debtor by Coin.O-Matic can be circumvented simply by including a
future advance clause in the security agreement. Second, the court seemed to misunderstand commercial practice. Lenders rarely knowingly make loans which will be in a second secured position. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 1038-40.
59. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-923(e) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-204(5) (1962)).
60. See cases cited in J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 1039 n.4.
61. Subsection (7) provides: If future advances are made while a security interest is perfected
by filing, the taking of posession, or under Section 8-321 on securities, the security interest has the same priority for the purposes of subsection (5) with respect to the future
advances as it does with respect to the first advance. If a commitment is made before or
while the security interest is so perfected, the security interest has the same priority with
respect to advances made pursuant thereto. In other cases a perfected security interest
has priority from the date the advance is made.
62. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-923(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-204(3) (1972)).
63. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Comment 7 (1972).
64. WYO. STAT. §§ 34-21-922(a) (ii) and 34-21-932(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1) (b) and
9-303(1) (1972)); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-923(c) and 34-21-932(a) (1977) (U.C.C. §§ 9-204(1)

and 9-303(1) (1962)).
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Clearly the phrase "while a security interest is perfected" in the new
subsection refers to a perfected security interest which predates the future
advance, not one that is perfected by the making of that advance. Otherwise the independent requirement for a perfected security interest seems
superfluous. If a continuing effective financing statement or continued
possession of the collateral were the only condition of priority for the future
advance, the provision could have said so. The phrase apparently contemplates an unpaid balance of a prior loan still outstanding when the
future advance is made. Yet no sound reason appears to support a distinction between future advances made before and those made after repayment
of the first advance. Future advances made when a prior advance had been
reduced to $1.00, or presumably even to $.01, would enjoy priority retroactive to the original filing or possession date, but those made after a prior
advance had been repaid in full would not. Furthermore, so long as an effective financing statement survives or possession continues, Second (the
intervening lender) may learn of First's security interest and may inquire
about possible future advances. If First assures Second that none will be
made, Second should be safe in making his advance; otherwise, Second's
6
advance is made at his peril.
In view of the apparent desirability of granting the same priority to
future advances irrespective of whether or not a prior advance remains
outstanding, perhaps the prerequisite to perfection that "value has been
given" should be accorded its literal interpretation. Value has been given
when First's first loan was made; it is irrelevant that the value given is no
longer outstanding." Although they did not tell us so, the drafters may
have intended this reading of the amendments. The Code's value requirement specified that "a security interest cannot attach until . . .value is
given." 67 If carried forward into the amendments, this formulation may
have been even more susceptible than its replacement ("value has been
given") to the interpretation that the value given must be outstanding at
the time of a future advance. An implication may be derived from this
change that the drafters intended to protect the future advance made after
a prior advance has been repaid. Furthermore, the Review Committee's
discussion of prior case law seems to disapprove the opposite result.6 8
65. Whether Second would in fact be protected against First's priority for a future advance
made in violation of an assurance is not entirely clear. Section 9-208 directs that a secured
party must provide certain information to his debtor and is liable for loss from his failure
to comply. That section does not include information respecting future advances, which
may imply that no liability would exist. If the secured party did provide a requested
assurance, however, he may be estopped from asserting a future advance priority over an
intervening advance made in reliance on that assurance. Perhaps speculation on the effect of an assurance is itself fruitless. Lenders rarely knowingly make secured loans subject to a prior security interest. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The conflict
will probably arise only when Second secured party is ignorant of First's security
interest.
66. This interpretation would not obviate the necessity for an effective financing statement
or the secured party's possession of the collateral since they are independent prereq uiites of perfection. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-931(a), 34-21-932(a) and 34-21-941 (e) (i)
(Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-303(1) and 9-312(5) (a) (1972)).
67. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-923(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1962)).
68. Discussing Coin-O-Matic Service Co. V. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., which it disapproved, the Review Committee suggested that the result was in part predicated on the
repayment of the first loan. See Draft No. 2, supra note 4, at 32.
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A section 9-312(5) problem involving priority of security interests in
proceeds, which has been dubbed "largely academic but truly intriguing,"6 9
was also identified under the Code.70 Assume that First secured party obtained a security interest in debtor's accounts, with financing statement fil
ed. After First's filing, Second secured party obtained a security interest,
with appropriate filing, in debtor's inventory and its proceeds-the proceeds being the accounts that were subject to First's security interest.
Which one had priority? Section 9-312(5) (a), protecting the first to file, supported First's priority because First filed first. Section 9-306(3), however,
provided that a proceeds interest "is a continuously perfected security interest if the interest in the original collateral was continuously perfected
...." Since Second's original collateral was inventory, not accounts, he
might contend that his "continuously perfected security interest" in the inventory and proceeds took priority over the accounts interest of First.
First probably should prevail because 9-306 did not set priorities but merely
prescribed that Second's security interest continued perfected in the proceeds. 7 1 Priorities should, therefore, be determined by the priority provisions of 9-312(5).12 Further, if Second properly polices its inventory financing arrangement, Second should require debtor to pay it from the proceeds
of debtor's assignment of the accounts to First, the accounts financer.7 3
The amendments appear more clearly to resolve the conflict in favor of
First. Section 9-312(3), governing the priority of a purchase money security
interest in inventory, accords that interest priority only "in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer
75
.... ,,74 This clearly excludes accounts which are not cash proceeds.
Although this provision is designed to govern conflicts between two security interests which originated in inventory and not between one originating
in inventory and the other originating in accounts, it suggests by analogy
that the accounts interest should prevail. This result is confirmed by the
Reasons for 1972 Change.76 Moreover, section 9-312(6) fixes the filing or
perfection date respecting proceeds as the filing or perfection date respecting original collateral. Under the 9-312(5) first to file or perfect rule,
therefore, an earlier filed accounts interest would enjoy priority. Conversely, if filing of the inventory security interest were first in time, the proceeds
interest in the resulting accounts would take priority over the accounts
69. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 1040.
70. See Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 232,
239 (1965).
71. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962)).
72. This conclusion is not expressed by but could be inferred from J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 16, at 1040. Contra Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 COLum. L. REv. 232, 240 (1965).
73. Cf., Associates Discount Corp. v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 220 A.2d 621 (1966)
(where chattel paper arising from sale of inventory was sold by debtor, held in view of
9-308 that inventory fmancer relegated to security mterest in proceeds received for chat-

tel paper).
74. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972)).
75. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972)).

76. The Review Committee asserts that, since accounts financing is more important to the
economy than inventory financing, the law should make accounts financing certain as to
its position. Once filing of an accounts interest occurs, therefore, it should take a priority
over a later filed inventory and proceeds interest. U.C.C. § 9-312, Reasons for 1972
Change, para. (4).
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security interest. A search of filed financing statements will alert each type
of financer to possible prior interests in accounts.
Secured Party v. Secured Party (InventoryFinancerv. Chattel Paper and
Instrument Financer)
In a vein somewhat similar to the conflict between the inventory and
the accounts security interests, conflicts may also arise between the inventory financer and the financer of chattel paper 77 or instruments.78 Chattel
paper or instruments are often received by sellers in payment for relatively
expensive goods, such as automobiles, boats, airplanes and others, for
which the buyer wishes to pay over time. Some sellers finance their inventory with one financer and the chattel paper or instruments received upon
the inventory's sale with another. Recognizing the importance of financing
arrangements secured by chattel paper produced upon the sale of inventory, the drafters sought to facilitate financing of this sort. 79 To accomplish
this facilitation the Code accorded priority over some preexisting security
interests to two classes of purchasers 0 who took possession of collateral of
this type. Purchasers without knowledge of a security interest in a specific
chattel paper or non-negotiable instrument gained priority over a security
interest perfected by permissive filing or temporarily perfected without filing. Purchasers of chattel paper were also blessed with priority in spite of
their knowledge of a security interest in specific chattel paper when the
security interest was claimed merely as proceeds of inventory."' While retaining the Code's basic treatment, the amendments expand the protection
accorded both classes of purchasers to cover all instruments, whether
negotiable or non-negotiable, in addition to chattel paper.82
Some confusion is created by the amendments' provision which
predicates protection of purchasers on whether the inventory financer
claims the collateral "merely as proceeds." The drafters evidently intended
that all security interests are "claimed merely as proceeds," unless the inventory financer "by some new transaction with the debtor acquired a
specific interest in the chattel paper" and that the lender must have "given
value against the paper." 88 The term "merely as proceeds," however, does
not appear to be so limited. A specific reference to chattel paper and instruments in a security agreement and financing statement might imply
the lender's reliance on this collateral independently and not "merely as
proceeds."'" One recommended interpretation of this phrase would permit
77. "Chattel paper" includes the evidence of debt and the security interest. See Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-905(a) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C.§ 9-105(1) (b)(1972)).
78. "Instrument" includes a negotiable instrument and certain evidences of the right to payment. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (ix) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (i) (1972)).
79. See U.C.C. § 9-308, Comment 1 (1972).
80. "Purchaser" includes a secured party. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-120(a) (xxxii) and (xxxiii)
(1977) (U.C.C. § 1-201(32) and (33) (1962)).
81. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-937 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-308 (1962)). As used in this section, "permissive filing" refers to perfection of a security interest in chattel paper by filing.
82. WYO.STAT. § 34-21-937 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-308 (1972)). In some circumstances the
section protects purchasers with knowledge of a prior security interest. These purchasers
could not be holders in due course of an instrument. U.C.C. § 9-308, Reasons for 1972
83. U.C.C. 9-308, Comments 2 and 3 (1972).
84. (Emphasis added). See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Financial Services Co., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 488, 211 S.E.2d 430 (1974) (inclusion of "proceeds" in
financing statement held not to prevent claim from being "merely proceeds" claim).
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the lender to testify that he in fact relied upon these proceeds to establish
that he did not claim them "merely as proceeds." ' 5 The provision fails to
achieve its goal of promoting this financing activity, however, if the prospective purchaser must determine the inventory financer's intent in order
to apply the "merely as proceeds" test. The amendments provision also
sets a trap for unwary inventory financers who believe that a specific claim
to this type collateral will protect them against subsequent financers.
If the drafters intended that a subsequent financer have priority over
any inventory financer who does not, by a new transaction, make an advance against the chattel paper or instrument, the statutory provision
could have said so. Beyond this concern, however, neither the justification
nor the necessity is apparent for extraordinary protection of purchasers
when an inventory financer claims chattel paper or instruments merely as
proceeds. What if a first financer makes loans in amounts exceeding those
which would have been made in reliance on inventory alone? Its willingness
to make these loans might be predicated on the expectation that repayment
will be secured also by chattel paper and instruments received upon the sale
of the debtor's inventory. Notwithstanding this expectation, is its security
interest in these proceeds "merely" a proceeds claim? The Comments suggest that it is, but this interpretation may unjustifiably subordinate the
first financer's security interest to one obtained by a subsequent chattel
paper or instruments financer. Perhaps the drafters concluded that loans
of this type simply are not made to borrowers likely to utilize chattel paper
or instruments as collateral for additional financing from a second
financer. If so, the Comments are silent respecting this conclusion.
Even if industry practice precludes the likelihood that a first financer
may initially lend more in expectation of chattel paper or instruments to be
received upon sale of inventory, the practical necessity of the merely as
proceeds provision seems questionable. Presumably the drafters intended
to enable debtors who finance their inventory to utilize chattel paper and
instruments as collateral for additional financing from a second financer.
But the merely as proceeds provision is necessary to accomplish this purpose only when a purchaser knows that the specific paper or instrument is
6
subject to a security interest.A
The Comments admonish financers to
85. (Emphasis added). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 1080. One court has
held that lender's failure to enter into a new transaction with the debtor or to place
substantial reliance on the chattel paper results in a claim merely as proceeds. The opinion implies that the inventory financer would not hold a mere proceeds claim if the debtor
were required to turn over chattel paper to it, even if no new value were advanced
against the old paper. Rex Financial Corp. v. Great Western Bank & Trust, 23 Ariz. App.
286, 532 P.2d 558 (1975) (decided under 1962 U.C.C.).
86. Lacking that knowledge, a purchaser is protected even if he knows of a security interest
in chattel paper or instruments generally. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-937(a) (i) (Supp. 1983)
(U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (1972)). If it is established that the inventory financer claims the chattel paper and instruments merely as proceeds, however, the mere proceeds provision
does obviate the need to determine whether the chattel paper or instruments financer
had knowledge of the inventory financer's security interest. Avoidance of knowledge
disputes is consistent with other provisions in which the drafters have sought to avoid
litigation of disputes over knowledge of a security interest. Compare WYO. STAT. §§
34-21-930(a) (ii) and 34-21-941(e) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1) (b) and 9-312(5) (1972).
Knowledge disputes under this section could be minimized by limiting the inventory
financer's protection to cases in which it either takes possession of or stamps notice of the
security interest on the paper.
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stamp or note their interest on chattel paper left in a debtor's possession,
thereby notifying a potential second financer of that interest.8 7 It seems
unlikely that a prospective financer would invite a lawsuit by purchasing or
lending on the security of collateral which he knew was claimed by another.
If this assumption is accurate, the merely as proceeds provision will not
often enable debtors to obtain additional financing from a second financer
who knows of the first financer's claim. In view of the provision's potential
to create confusion, perhaps the amendments would be improved by its
deletion.
PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS

As has been evident throughout the discussion of priorities, perfection
of security interests is a central concept in the law of secured transactions.
A security interest which has attached but is not perfected will entitle the
secured party, as against a debtor in default, to repossess and sell collateral
to recover payment of the secured debt. Unless the security interest is
perfected, however, the secured party's rights in collateral will be subordinate to the rights of lien creditors (including, most importantly, a trustee
in bankruptcy and the tax collector), buyers and other secured parties.88
Both the Code and amendments envision that security interests will be
perfected by filing a financing statement,8 9 but also permit the secured party to perfect by taking possession of the collateral in most cases; 90 with a
few exceptions, they both require that possession be taken to perfect a
security interest in money or instruments, other than instruments which
constitute part of chattel paper. 91 Filing or possession by the secured party
enables anyone making appropriate inquiry to determine that a security interest exists. In a few cases the Code and amendments dispense with the
requirements because the cost outweighs the likely benefit. Probably the
most important of the exceptions is for purchase money security interests
in consumer goods other than motor vehicles and fixtures. 92 Alternative
perfection provisions are also provided to recognize federal laws requiring
recording of security interests and the possibility that states may enact
87. See U.C.C. § 9-308, Comment 3 (1972). Except for the 10-day perfection in proceeds
under section 9-306(3), security interests in instruments not a part of chattel paper must
be perfected by possession. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-933(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-304(1)
(1972)).

88. Although, when a financing statement is filed, priority over other security interests dates
from filing, that priority is meaningless until a security agreement is signed, value given
and the debtor has rights in collateral. Upon the occurrence of the last of these three
events, the security interest becomes perfected if a financing statement is filed. See Wyo.
STAT. §§ 34-21-922(a) and 34-21-932(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1) and 9-303 (1)
(1972)).
89. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(a) (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1962 & 1972)).
90. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-934 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-305 (1962 & 1972)). A security
interest in accounts and general intangibles may be perfected only by filing. See WYo.
STAT.

§ 34-21-931(a) (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1962 & 1972)).

91. (WYo. STAT. § 34-21-933(a) (1977 & Supp. 1983) U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1962 & 1972)). The
reference to "money" was added in 1972. Temporary perfection without possession is
possible for 21 days under section 9-304(4) and (5) (1962 and 1972) (WYo. STAT. §
34-21-933(d) and (e) (1977 & Supp. 1983)) and for 10 days as to proceeds under section
9-306(2) and (3) (1962 & 1972) (WYO. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) and (c) (1977 & Supp. 1983)).
92. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(a) (iv) (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d) (1962 &
1972)). Other exceptions to the filing requirement are also listed. See Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-931(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1972)).
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alternative perfection requirements with respect to property governed by a
certificate of title.98
The amendments make some changes in the Code's exceptions to the
filing requirements and in the federal perfection reference. They delete an
exception from the filing requirement for perfection of a purchase money
security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not over
$2,500.94 Although the exception was intended to facilitate farmers' use of
this equipment as collateral, it has been found to produce the opposite
result 95 since lenders could not determine from the record whether prior
security interests existed in this equipment. The amendments insert an exception which exempts from the filing requirement security interests
created by assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust or decedent's
estate. 6 Assignees of these interests do not ordinarily think of these
assignments as subject to Article 9. Failure to comply with a filing requiremany of these assignments unperfected
ment might, therefore, render
97
against third party claimants.
Both the code and amendments except from the filing requirement purchase money security interests in consumer goods9" and except from the
exception (require filing to perfect) security interests in motor vehicles and
in fixtures. The Code referred to motor vehicles required to be licensed; the
amendments changed "licensed" to "registered." Presumably, in some
states, some types of motor vehicles must be registered but not licensed.
Further, the amendments revise the treatment of fixtures to require fixture filing only where necessary to priority over conflicting real estate interests. 99 Priority over conflicting interests in fixtures other than conflicting real estate interests may be obtained by an ordinary filing. The Official
amendments add a new provision to except from filing assignments for
benefit of creditors and subsequent transfers by the assignee. 100 Wyoming
omitted this new provision.
The Code exempted from its financing statement filing requirements
security interests as to which registration or filing was governed by a
United States statute.' 01 The amendments expand this provision to exempt
from the filing requirements security interests as to which registration, filing or certificate notation, or filing in a place different from that specified
by the amendments, is required by United States statute or treaty. 0 2 The
amendments also revise Code provisions requiring notation of security
93. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(c) and (d) (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(3) and (4)
(1962 & 1972)).
94. The deleted provision was Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(a) (iii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (c)
(1962)).
95. U.C.C. § 9-302, Reasons for 1972 Change.
96. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(a) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (c)(1972)).
97. U.C.C. § 9-302, Reasons for 1972 Change.
98. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(a) (iv) (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (d) (1962 & 1972)).
99. A fixture filing is required to obtain priority over real estate interests when goods,

because of their relation to real estate, become subject to claims of holders of those in-

terests. See infra text accompanying notes 281-84 for a discussion of fixture filings.
100. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (g) (1972).
101. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-931(c) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (a) (1962)).
102. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-931(c) (i) and (d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (a) and (4) (1972)).
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interests on certificates of title. These provisions are discussed below in
connection with motor vehicle security interests. 0 3
Some additional changes in the provisions governing the filing, content
and duration of effectiveness of financing statements merit brief description. The Wyoming Code contains its own unique provisions respecting the
place of filing. Financing statements with respect to most collateral must
be filed in the county clerk's office in the county in which the debtor's principal place of business or residence is located. If the debtor resides out-ofstate, filing must be in the Wyoming Secretary of State's office. With
respect to fixtures, filing must be in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate concerned would be filed or recorded. Filing regarding accounts
must be made in both the county clerk's office where the debtor's principal
104
place of business is located and in the Office of the Secretary of State.
These basic requirements have not been significantly affected by the
amendments. 105 Presumably the emphasis on county filing reflects the
perceived inconvenience to people in many parts of the state if financing
statement files are maintained only in the Secretary of State's office.
The Official Code offered two alternatives respecting the effect on
perfection of a change in the county of debtor's residence or place of
business or of the collateral's location, whichever controlled the original filing. 06 Wyoming chose the second alternative under which the filing remained effective for four months after that change and also continued in effect thereafter if a financing statement was filed in the new county within
four months. Filing after the four-month period was effective only prospectively from the filing date. 0 7 The provision excepts motor vehicles from its
refiling requirement. 08 The Wyoming amendments effect a change in
philosophy respecting this refiling requirement by adopting the first alternative Official Code provision. It requires no refiling upon either change of
location within a state or change of use. 109 This revision shifts the burden of
protecting against loss from the secured party to persons dealing with the
debtor and collateral at their new location. These persons must determine
103. See infra text accompanying notes 147-52.
104. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(a) (1977). The required place of filing when a debtor maintains
his principal place of business in the state but resides elsewhere was unclear. This may be
an infrequent occurrence.
105. A new subsection provides that an organization's residence is its place of business, or, if it
has more than one, its chief executive office. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(f) (Supp. 1983)
(U.C.C. § 9-401(6) (1972)). The subsection was added to deal primarily with filing against
farmers under the second and third alternative filing provisions which have not been
adopted in Wyoming. See U.C.C. § 9-401, Reasons for 1972 Change.
106. U.C.C. § 9-401(3) (1962).
107. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(c) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-401(3) (2d alternative) (1962)). The fourmonth refiling requirement upon movement among counties within the same state is patterned on a similar requirement for refiling upon movement of the collateral from one

state to another. See U.C.C. § 9-401, Comment 6 (1972).

108. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(c) (1977). Unlike the Official Code, the Wyoming Code requires
filing, as well as title certificate notation, to perfect security interests in motor vehicles.
For a discussion of Wyoming motor vehicle security interests, see infra text accompany-

ing notes 147-92. No exception for motor vehicles appears in the official version. If the

drafters of the Wyoming version considered refiling unnecessary in view of the requirement for notation of the security interest on the certificate, this seems inconsistent with
application of a filing requirement to motor vehicles.
109. Wyo. STkT. § 34-21-950(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-401(3) (1st alternative) (1972)). The
Official amendments made no change in the two alternatives as they appeared in the
Official Code.
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that the change of location has occurred and then search the financing
statement file in both the new and the original county. 110
The Wyoming amendments adopt the special transmitting utility provision which first appeared in the Official amendments. The provision requires filing only in the office of the Secretary of State regardless of the
type of collateral subject to the security interest."' Since transmitting
utilities may own fixtures in many different counties, this provision avoids
the necessity for multiple filings. 1" 2 The impact of this amendment in
Wyoming will not be great even though it effects significant amendments
in the Wyoming Code. Prior to 1983, Wyoming had adopted a Transmitting
Utility Act which provided for perfection of security interests in collateral
of a transmitting utility by a single filing under the Wyoming Code in the
Secretary of State's office." 3 The Wyoming amendments do not repeal the
Act, nor is it clear that the Act is implicitly repealed. The amendments and
the Act 4are sufficiently similar, however, that no substantive conflict is
likely."
Several changes have been made in the requisites for the content and
filing of the financing statement. The amendments delete a Code requirement for signature of financing statements by the secured party."15 Only
the debtor must now sign. Signature problems may remain, however, when
it becomes necessary to file a financing statement after the original transaction occurred. By then the debtor may be either unavailable or unwilling
to sign a new financing statement. The Code provides for some cira financing statement signed by the secured party
cumstances in which
17
only may be filed."16 Other circumstances are added by the amendments.
The solution provided with respect to one of these circumstances seems
110. The practical effect of the change may not be as great as it seems. Since the security interest remained perfected for four months without refiling under the Wyoming Code, it
also required that, during the four-month period, persons dealing with the debtor and collateral in the new location search in both the new and the original county.
111. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-950(e) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-401(5) (1972)).
112. In the absence of a provision of this sort, a filing with respect to fixtures might be rein the
records
thebecome
mortgage
in to
filings
Fixture
manythecounties.
quired
is located.
fixtures
or are
goodsbearemade
the must
in which
real estate
where
county in

113.

114.

115.
116.
117.

WYo. STAT. § 34-21-950(s) (ii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9401(1) (b) (1962)). A fixture filing must
be made to assure priority over real estate interests whenever goods are or are to become
so related to real estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law. WYO. STAT.
§ 34-21-942 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313 (1972)).
A transmitting utility incudes persons primarily engaged in railroad, electric or electronic communications transmission, transmission or production and transmission of electricity, sewer service and other similar businesses. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (xiv) (Supp.
1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (n) (1972)).
WYO. STAT. §§ 374-101 to -104 (1977).
Although the definition of "transmitting utility" is somewhat broader in the amendments
(WYo. STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (xiv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (n) (1972)) than in the
Transmitting Utility Act, (WYo. STAT. § 374-101(a) (ii) (1977)), the definitions do not
seem to conflict. The Act provides that, unless displaced by its specific provisions, the
Wyoming code supplements those provisions.
See U.C.C. § 9402, Reasons for 1972 Change.
These circumstances include change of location of collateral to a new state and perfection
as to proceeds of collateral. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-951(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9402(2)
(1962)).
These include change of debtor's location to a new state, and change of name, identity or
corporate structure of the debtor. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-951(b) (i) and (iv) (Supp. 1983)
(U.C.C. § 9-402(2) (a) and (d) (1972)).
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unfortunate. This addition permits filing of a financing statement signed
only by the secured party to perfect a security interest as to which the filing
has lapsed.118 The requirement that the secured party wait until lapse
before filing will adversely affect the priority of his security interest. The
new financing statement will be effective only from the date of filing,
forfeiting the secured party's priority against intervening lien creditors
and purchasers. 1 9 The secured party should have been authorized to file a
continuation statement before the financing statement lapsed and thereby
preserve his priority.
Under the Code disputes arose respecting the effectiveness of financing statements filed to perfect security interests in collateral of debtors using trade names.1 20 Was it necessary or permissible to identify the debtor
by his trade name? Was it required that the debtor's real name be included?
Some courts held that inclusion of the trade name alone did not comply
with the statutory requirement that the financing statement name the debtor.1 21 The amendments specify that the financing statement sufficiently
shows a debtor's name if it gives the individual, partnership or corporate
name. A trade name or names of partners may be added but are not required. 122 Use of a trade name alone, while not contemplated by the
drafters, 23 might be effective if that name sufficiently identifies the debtor
so that one searching the 124
financing statement index should recognize the
trade name as the debtor.
Additional questions arose under the Code respecting the necessity for
refiling when a debtor changed its name, identity or corporate structure.
The amendments require refiling in these circumstances if the change
renders the original financing statement seriously misleading. Refiling,
when necessary, is required only to perfect the security interest in collateral acquired more than four months after the change; the original filing
remains effective as to collateral acquired before the change or within the
four-month period. By contrast, transfer of collateral by the debtor does
not require a new filing even though the secured party knows of, or consents to, the transfer.12 The burden is on persons dealing with a transferee
to determine the identity of his transferor and check
the financing state12 6
ment file for security interests in the collateral.
118. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-951(b) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-402(2) (c) (1972)). The effectiveness of a financing statement lapses five years after filing unless a continuation statement is filed. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-952(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1972)).
119. See WYo. STAT. § 34-21-952(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1972)). The priority between secured parties in this situation is not entirely clear. The governing provision
specifies that a lapsed financing statement renders the security interest unperfected as
against any person who became a purchaser or lien creditor before lapse. The provision
does not similarly address effectiveness as against secured parties. The term
"purchaser," however, includes holders of security interests. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-120(a)
(xxxii) and (xxxiii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 1-201(1) (32) and (33) (1962)).
120. E.g., In re Leichter, 471 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Hill, 363 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Miss.
1973).
121. Id.
122. Wyo. STAT. § 84 -2 1-9 5 1(g) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972)).
123. See U.C.C. § 9-403(5) (1972) (not adopted in Wyoming); U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 7
(1972).
124. A substantially complying financing statement is effective even though it contains minor
errors not seriously misleading. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-951(h) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §
9-402(8) (1972)).
125. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-951(g) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1972)).
126. U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 8 (1972).
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The provision just mentioned, relieving the secured part of any obligation to refile upon transfer of the collateral, has provoked dispute over continued perfection in some circumstances. Upon request by Debtor, Secured
consents to the sale of collateral to Buyer, who is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 27 No one mentions continuation of the security
interest. Does that interest continue after the sale? The amendments provision, which obviates reffling even if a secured party consents to transfer of
the collateral, may imply that the security interest continues. 2 In another
provision, however, the amendments specify that "a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition
thereof unless the dispositionwas authorized ...in the security agreement
or otherwise .... ,129 This latter provision omits any independent requirement for specific release of the security interest. It directly provides that a
security interest survives only if no authorization of transfer is given while
the refiling provision simply supports an inference that the security interest survives in spite of consent to transfer. The apparent inconsistency
between the two provisions could be reconciled by reading the refiling provision's consent reference to apply to cases in which a consenting secured
party expressly provides for continuation of the security interest. Conversely, it could be reconciled by reading into the continuation provision a
requirement for specific release of the security interest.12 0 The latter approach recognizes that often consent to transfer is needed solely to avoid
default which could accelerate the due date of a debt. This argues that consent should not impliedly release the collateral from a security interest. The
former approach assumes that, while directing his attention to the consent
to transfer, the secured party can specifically provide for continuation of
his interest if desired. In many cases the secured party will be more
knowledgeable about secured transactions law than a buyer. It seems
preferable therefore to require that the secured party expressly protect his
rights, thereby avoiding surprise of one who may mistakenly believe that a
consent releases the security interest.
The amendments effect several changes in the duration of filing and
the effect of lapsed filing. They delete a provision limiting the period of effectiveness for a financing statement to sixty days after the maturity date
of an obligation when the financing statement specifies that date. 3 1 Except for a financing statement respecting collateral of a transmitting utility
and a real estate mortgage effective as a fixture filing, 182 the amendments
make all financing statements effective for five years unless a termination
statement is filed. The drafters believe that this will facilitate renewals and
127. Most buyers of goods in the ordinary course of business take them free of a security interest created by the seller. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-307(1)
(1972)).
128. See Matto's Inc. v. Olde Colony Place, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1750 (Bankr. ED Mich. 1981).
129. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972) (WYO. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) (Supp. 1983)). (Emphasis supplied).
130. The Matto's court chose this reconciliation. See supra note 129.
131. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-952(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1962)). Unless the security
agreement itself is filed, the financing statement would rarely specify the maturity date
of an obligation.
132. A financing statement respecting collateral of a transmitting utility may be made effective until a termination statement is filed. A mortgage effective as a fixture filing remains an effective fixture filing until released or satisfied of record or otherwise terminated as to the real estate. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-952(f) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9403(6)
(1972)).
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extensions without concern for premature expiration of a financing statement.13 3 Another change tolls the expiration of the five-year period during
insolvency proceedings. A financing statement that would have expired
during the proceeding remains effective until sixty days thereafter .134
Commentators had disagreed respecting whether a lapse of a financing
statement terminated an existing priority over an intervening purchaser,
lien creditor or secured party.' 35 Since the intervening party had originally
acquired his interest subject to the security interest, some argued that the
lapse should not affect the priority, but should simply render the security
interest prospectively unperfected. The amendments opt for the opposite
result, specifying that the lapse renders the security interest "unperfected
before
as against a person who became a purchaser or lien creditor"
1 37
lapse. 18 6 The term "purchaser" also includes secured parties.
The Code required a secured party to provide the debtor with a termination statement upon debtor's written request whenever no outstanding secured obligation or commitment to make advances existed.'8 8 The
amendments add that the secured party must supply a termination statement for each filing officer with whom a financing statement was filed. l3 9
Perhaps more significantly, the amendments add a new provision requiring
that, when collateral is consumer goods, the secured party shall file a termination statement either within one month, or ten days following written
demand, after there is no outstanding secured obligation or commitment to
make advances.' 40 The automatic one-month filing requirement, which
mandates filing even in the absence of demand by the debtor, recognizes
that many consumers will not understand the importance of clearing the
files.' 41 Failure to comply with these requirements for providing or filing
termination statements subjects the third party to liability for $100142plus the
amount of any loss incurred by debtor as a result of the failure.
The Code and amendments both provide that Article 9 applies "to any
transaction (regardless of form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property . . . . ",4 Disputes often arise respecting
133. U.C.C. § 9-403, Reasons for 1972 Change.
134. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-952(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1972)). The drafters suggest
that a secured party who expects the debtor to continue in existence (operation?) after the
proceeding should file a continuation statement "on the normal schedule" to preserve the
fiig. U.C.C. § 9-403, Reasons for 1972 Change. Filing during a bankruptcy proceeding
might be barred by the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (4) (1982)) if it is considered an
act to perfect the security interest.
135. See U.C.C. § 9-403 Reasons for 1972 Change.
136. WYO.STAT. § 34-21-952(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9403(2) (1972)).
137. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-120(a) (xxxii) and (xxxiii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 1-201(32) and (33)
(1962)); R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 81 (2d ed. 1979).
138. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-953(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1962)).
139. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-953(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1972)). In Wyoming, when the
collateral is accounts, one financing statement must be filed in the office of the Secretary
of State and another in the office of the county clerk where the assignor's (debtor's) principal place of business is located. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-950(a) (1977).
140. .
141. See U.C.C. § 9-404, Reasons for 1972 Change. The burden is not as great as it may appear
because no financing statement is filed to perfect most consumer goods security
interests. Id.
142. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-953(a) (Supp. 1983) (J.C.C. § 9-404(1) (1972)).
143. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-902(a) (i) (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (a) (1962 & 1972)).
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whether a transaction denominated as a consignment or lease is intended
to create a security interest.'" If an alleged consignment or lease is held to
be a security interest, that interest will ordinarily be unperfected because a
financing statement will not have been filed. To prevent this the consignor
or lessor may wish to file a financing statement even though he does not intend to create a security interest. The Code, however, contained no provision specifically prescribing the nature of the financing statement to be filed in these circumstances. This omission is rectified by the amendments
which authorize consignors or lessors to file financing statements using the
terms "consignor," "consignee," "lessor" and "lessee" instead of
"secured party" and "debtor." Filing by either consignor or lessor is not to
be considered in determining whether or not the consignment or lease is intended as security, but, if it is determined that they are so intended, this filing perfects the security interest. 45
Among the most significant changes which affect the content and filing
of a financing statement are those respecting perfection of a security interest in goods which are or are to become fixtures. The significance of
these changes may be better appreciated, however, if their consideration is
deferred until other changes in the Code's fixture provisions are
reviewed. 146
WYOMING MOTOR VEHICLE SECURITY INTERESTS

Security interests in motor vehicles have long presented peculiarly difficult problems. Perfection by the filing of a financing statement is inadequate because, after filing, the owner could sell the vehicle to a nonprofessional buyer who would not know of the need to check financing statement
filings. Only after the purchase would the luckless buyer learn of the security interest. Moreover, in view of the ease with which most types of motor
vehicles move from one place to another, the owner might sell or encumber
his vehicle far away from the place where notice of a security interest was
filed. In this case, a buyer or second secured party might not be appropriately apprised of the place where a financing statement search
should be made. To alleviate these problems and others, 147 many states
have long required issuance of a certificate of title evidencing ownership of
a motor vehicle and notation on the certificate of security interests in the
144. See, e.g., Mann v. Clark Oil & Refining Corporation, 302 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mo. 1969),
af d, 425 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1970) ("consignment" held security interest); Peco, Inc. v.
Hartbauer Tool & Die Co., 262 Ore. 573, 500 P.2d 308 (1972) ("lease" held security
interest).
145. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-957 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-408 (1972)). Filing of a financing statement is not required with respect to true leases, which are not intended to create a security interest. While theoretically unassailable, this rule is practically questionable. In the

absence of filing, it may be difficult or impossible for third parties to determine that the

goods are not owned by the lessee. If they mistakenly lend on the security of leased goods
or purchase those goods, believing them to be owned, they are injured as much or more
than if the goods were subject to a security interest. Further, the lessee may choose to
lease rather than buy simply as a method of financing his use of the goods. Cf WYo. STAT.
§ 34-21-902(a) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (b) and Comment 2 (1972)) applying Article 9 to sales of accounts and chattel paper. It does not appear that a filing requirement
respecting true leases of goods would unduly burden lessors or the Code filing system.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 281-84.
147. Perhaps the most serious problem addressed by the certificate of title laws was the
absence of a reliable means to establish ownership.
In connection with preparation of the motor vehicle section of the article, some random inquiries were made respecting practice of Wyoming county clerks and lenders.
While the inquiries were not methodical, they indicated that practices vary rather widely.
Footnotes and text refer to the results of these inquiries where appropriate.
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have long required issuance of a certificate of title evidencing ownership of
a motor vehicle and notation on the certificate of security interests in the
vehicle. In a state which requires notation on motor vehicle title certificates, reference to the certificate will reveal to a potential buyer, a
potential secured lender and other interested persons the existence of any
security interests.
In view of the prevalence of state motor vehicle certificate of title
statutes requiring security interest notation, both the Official Code and the
Official amendments contain alternative perfection provisions which require compliance with those statutes to perfect security interests in collateral subject to them.1 4 8 When Wyoming originally adopted the Code, the
Legislature did not adopt the Official Code version of the state alternative
perfection provisions. Instead it inserted specific requirements governing
perfection and termination of security interests in motor vehicles. 149 The
principal perfection requirement dictates both filing and notation of the
security interest on the vehicle's title certificate. 8 0
Curiously, having omitted the Official Code provisions for state alternative perfection in favor of its own motor vehicle provisions, Wyoming
then adopted the Official amendments to the omitted Code provisions. As
adopted by Wyoming, the provisions refer to the certificate of title law
which requires only notation of liens or encumbrances existing when the
certificate is issued, not filing of a financing statement. 5 1 Having made
this reference, it might have been desirable, after some tinkering with the
certificate of title law, to delete from the Wyoming amendments the special2
provisions governing perfection of security interests in motor vehicles.1
Instead of collecting in one place all of the law governing perfection of
these security interests, however, the procedure chosen retains part of that
law in the Wyoming amendments and relegates the other part to the certificate of title statute. The result creates some potential problems.
The Wyoming amendments direct that: "(c) [tihe filing of a financing
statement otherwise required by this article is not necessary or effective to
148. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (b) and (4) (1962 & 1972). The provisions are not limited to motor
vehicles, but pertain to any property subject to certificate of title laws.
149. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(d)-(g) (1977).
150. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(d) (1977). Wyoming evidently abandoned the Official Code
model of perfection by a single notation on the title certificate at the behest of an
automobile dealers' association whose members had become accustomed to pre-Code law
requiring recording of a chattel mortgage and also title certificate notation.
151. Wyo. STAT. §§ 31-4-301 to -320 (1977 & Supp. 1983). The certificate of title statute,
which was originally adopted before adoption of the Wyoming Code, has retained the
term "liens or encumbrances" rather than "security interests."
152. The tinkering would have been required because the certificate of title law covers only
notation of security interests existing when the county clerk issues a certificate (WYO.
STAT. § 31-4-308 (Supp. 1983)), not those created while the certificate is outstanding. Provision for perfecting security interests created when a certificate is already outstanding
must appear somewhere. It may have been considered simpler to leave it in the Wyoming
amendments rather than to amend another statute. It is not clear, however, that this consideration motivated the unusual result of dividing these perfection provisions between
two statutes. The Wyoming Legislative Service Office reports that a Wyoming amendments bill was initially presented to it without the motor vehicle perfection provisions,
which were contained in the Wyoming Code. On the ground that it is not authorized to
make substantive changes in existing statutes, that office inserted provisions virtually
identical to those contained in the Wyoming Code.
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perfect a security interest in property subject to . . . (ii) The following
statutes of this state, W.S. 31-4-301 through 31-4-320 [the certificate of
title statute] ..... " And further: "(d) [c]ompliance with a statute or treaty
described in subsection (c) of this section is equivalent to the filing of a
financing statement under this article, and a security interest in property
subject to the statute or treaty can be perfected only by compliance
therewith .... 155 Together the provisions leave no doubt-filing is neither
necessary nor effective to perfect; perfection is accomplished only by compliance with the certificate of title statute. Pristine clarity (a lawyer's
joy)-but... immediately after the pristine clarity follow four subsections
wholly devoted to prescribing the process for perfecting and terminating a
security interest in motor vehicles. 54 As already indicated, 165 the first of
these subsections, in unmistakable terms, mandates the filing of a financing statement. 156 What are we to conclude from this head-on collision?
One possible conclusion is that the collision results from an unfortunate
legislative oversight. 157 New provisions were inserted, old provisions were
neither deleted nor appropriately modified. But the provisions are there
now and must be applied. Reading them literally we might conclude that
the certificate of title provisions govern only perfection of security interests created in a motor vehicle when the certificate is issued-new motor
vehicles. 15 8 The Wyoming amendments provisions would then govern only
perfection of security interests created in vehicles for which a certificate of
title was already outstanding-used vehicles. The Wyoming amendments
provisions inferentially support this division by requiring that owners of
vehicles concerning which a "certificate has been issued" deliver the certificate to the secured party for notation of the security interest.5 9 The
buyer of a new vehicle who finances the purchase does not receive the certificate until after the security interest has been noted on it. A requirement
that he deliver the certificate, with the security interest already noted, for
notation of the security interest, would be meaningless.
Although inferential support exists for limiting the Wyoming amendments to perfection of used vehicle security interests, the basic provision,
requiring both filing and notation, is not so limited. 6 0 Moreover, the interpretation that the Wyoming amendments govern perfection respecting
used vehicles only is inconsistent with another amendments provision that
the certificate of title statute governs duration and renewal of a security interest perfected by compliance with that statute.1 61 The certificate of title
statute contains no provisions governing these matters, suggesting that
153. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(c) (ii) and (d) (Supp. 1983). (Emphasis supplied). Except for the
reference to the Wyoming certificate of title statute, the quoted language is taken verbatim from U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (b) and (4) (1972).
154. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(e)-(h) (Supp. 1983).
155. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
156. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(e) (Supp. 1983).
157. But see supranote 152.
158. Certificates are not issued with respect to vehicles while they are owned by dealers. See
Wyo. STAT. § 31-4-305 (Supp. 1983). Cf. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(c) (ii) (Supp. 1983)
(U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (b) (1972)) (security interests in collateral held as inventory are

perfected by filing).

159. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(f) (Supp. 1983).
160. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(e) (Supp. 1983).
161. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (1972)).
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duration and renewal of security interests in all motor vehicles, new or
used, must be governed by the Wyoming amendments. Most significant,
the literal reading of the provisions would result in perfection of security interests in new vehicles by certificate notation without filing and of those in
used vehicles by both notation and filing.16 2 There appears no rational basis
for this distinction. The need of lenders, creditors and buyers to know of
existing security interests is the same regardless of when the interest is
created. The immediate solution seems to be to adopt an admittedly strained reading of the Wyoming amendments which simply ignores its provisions for perfection under the certificate of title statute. The amendments
provisions for dual perfection may then be applied to all motor vehicles.
The long term solution to the problem requires legislative revision of
the offending provisions. Revision must begin with a reappraisal of the dual
perfection scheme. Wyoming is one of the few Code jurisdictions which still
cling to the requirement for both title certificate notation and financing
statement filing to perfect motor vehicle security interests. 163 This suggests that most other state legislatures consider dual perfection unnecessary. In most cases parties dealing with a motor vehicle owner can
protect themselves by inspecting the certificate of title which will disclose
any security interest in the vehicle. The filing requirement is therefore
largely duplicative unless it will protect persons dealing with the debtor
against fraud perpetrated by obtaining a duplicate certificate which does
not reveal the security interest. It should not be possible for a debtor to obtain such a duplicate certificate. The Wyoming certificate of title statute
directs that, upon issuance, the county clerk prominently mark a duplicate
certificate with a warning that it might be subject to rights of persons
under the original. 164 Unfortunately, although a duplicate certificate will
probaby reveal that it is a duplicate, it appears that not all county clerks
scrupulously observe the directive for addition of this warning. Even if the
warning is omitted, however, a copy of the original certificate bearing the
security interest notation may be inspected in the issuing county clerk's office. 165 Consequently, a knowledgeable lender or buyer can protect itself
against fraud by requiring production of the original certificate or an acceptable explanation of its unavailability, or by checking the file copy of the
original certificate. 166
162. This procedure is not now ordinarily followed as to new vehicles. As under the Wyoming
Code, both a financing statement is filed and the security interest is noted on the
certificate.
163. At the time when the U.C.C. was originally introduced in the Wyoming legislature, one
noted commentator understandably anticipated that its adoption would eliminate dual filing in the state. See RUDOLPH in Wyo. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMITTEE, THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 63-64 (1960). Legislative changes from the Official Code
thwarted this expectation. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. Later, in
1981, a subcommittee of the Bar Legislative and Reform Committee urged adoption of
the amendments. The proposed amendments were modified to contain provision for
motor vehicle perfection by title certificate notation only. The amendments failed of
adoption in that legislative session.
164. Wyo. STAT. § 314-312 (Supp. 1983). At least one county clerk notifies the secured party
before issuing a duplicate.
165. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(f) (Supp. 1983).
166. The original certificate in a debtor's possession will not bear a notation, however, if a debtor defers creation of the security interest until after the duplicate issues and the notation
is made on the duplicate, leaving the debtor in possession of a clean original. This would
not happen with respect to new car financing at the time of purchase because security
interest notation occurs before certificate issuance.
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In view of the ability of the professional to protect against most
fraudulently obtained clean certificates without resort to the financing
statement file, the danger from these practices primarily threatens the
nonprofessional purchaser of a used vehicle. 1 7 In most cases, however, the
nonprofessional, not being conversant with secured transactions law, will
not know of the existence or significance of the financing statement files.
That purchaser will rely on the title certificate offered by his seller. A
fraudulently obtained certificate, bearing no entry in the space provided for
listing of security interests, will reassure him, if indeed he has identified
the problem of clear title. 168 Nor will a financing statement on file help the
unschooled nonprofessional who is unaware of its existence. The duplicate
perfection requirement must therefore be justified by its benefit to professional lenders and buyers who may succeed in protecting against some
fraud only by a financing statement search. 16 9 This benefit must be weighed against the cost of procuring, filing and maintaining these financing
statements and related records. Since losses from intentional misrepresentation may be relatively small, the possibility of their occurrence and of
their prevention through financing statement searches may not justify the
duplicate perfection requirement. To the extent that these losses are suffered by professionals, perhaps they should properly be considered a cost of
doing business. To the extent that they are suffered by nonprofessionals,
the filing requirement is unlikely to prevent them.
Any revision of the Wyoming motor vehicle perfection provisions
might also address other questions. 170 Whether or not the duplicative filing
provision is deleted, clarity would be served by transferring all motor vehicle perfection provisions to the certificate of title statute. This would
leave in the Wyoming amendments only the reference to that statute, as
recommended by the Official amendments. If the unique perfection provisions are to be retained, several additional questions require attention.
These begin with the dual filing requirement itself. It requires filing of "a
financing statement or security agreement"' 71 and, therefore, authorizes
filing of a security agreement instead of a financing statement. Although
the general filing provisions do countenance utilization of a security agreement as a financing statement, they specify that the agreement filed must
contain all information required in a financing statement. 72 The separate
reference in the Wyoming provisions to filing the security agreement
might authorize perfection by filing an agreement which did not contain all
167. In addressing multi-state transactions, the Review Committee recognized the relative inability of nonprofessionals to protect against title certificate fraud. See U.C.C. § 9-103(2)
(d) and Comment 4(e) (1972). For discussion of the amendments to section 9-103, see
infra text accompanying notes 219-53.
168. It is not clear that all nonprofessionals will be alerted to the problem even by the warning
required on duplicate certificates.
169. Even a search of the financing statement index in the county where a debtor resides ma
reveal nothing since the Wyoming statute requires filing where the vehicle is loe
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(e) (1) (Supp. 1983). Presumably 'located" means the vehicle's
location when the security interest is created which may differ from the debtor's
residence when he grants a security interest or sells the vehicle.
170. These questions also inhere in the prior Wyoming motor vehicle perfection provisions,
which are substantially identical to those contained in the amended statute. They are not,
therefore, introduced by changes made by the Wyoming amendments.
171. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(e) (i) (Supp. 1983).

172. Wyo.

STAT.

§ 34-21-951(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1972)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss2/10

28

Van Baalen: Wyoming Adopts the 1972 Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Art
1984

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9

requisite information. 17 Reference to filing the security agreement is unnecessary here and should be deleted.
The Wyoming notation procedure requires that the vehicle owner
deliver the title certificate to the secured party "who, within five (5) days
thereafter, shall deliver the certificate to the clerk of the county in which
the vehicle is located ..... " The provision fails to specify the effect of a
delivery to the clerk more than five days after the secured party receives a
certificate. The mere existence of the five-day requirement might imply
that later delivery defeats perfection, inviting speculation respecting
whether late delivery can ever be rectified. If it can, will delay subordinate
the security interest to the rights of intervening unsecured creditors?
Subordination did follow delay under some pre-Code chattel mortgage
statutes. The Code does not contemplate such subordination of security interests in other collateral to intervening unsecured creditors. 17 4 It seems
unlikely that the Wyoming Legislature intended to single out motor vehicle
security interests for this treatment.
If the Legislature did not intend to subordinate security interests
perfected after the five-day period, perhaps it intended a grace period for
filing. This would accord security interests perfected within the prescribed
period retroactive priority as of the date on which the secured party received the certificate. Some inferential support for this view might be drawn
from another sentence appearing in the same paragraph that contains the
five-day requirement. It provides that a financing statement or security
agreement "shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of filing and not before,."...,175 Since the sentence specifies only that a financing statement or agreement cannot take effect before filing but omits mention of certificate notation, it might be inferred that certificate notation
could take effect as of a time before it is made. This inference could support
an argument for priority based on retroactive effectiveness of the certificate notation.
Assuming the above-quoted language prescribes priority at all,
however, it seems to fix that priority by time of filing, not of certificate
notation. If retroactive priority is intended here, the provision does not
make that intention clear. Other provisions of the amendments do clearly
mandate retroactivity, 176 but that exalted status is reserved for purchase
money security interests filed within twenty days after the debtor receives
possession of the collateral. The five-day provision governs perfection of all
173. The information which is most likely to be omitted from a security agreement is the addresses of debtor and secured party.
174. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-930(a) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b) (1972)). The express
subordination to persons who become lien creditors before perfection implies that subordination to persons advancing unsecured credit between attachment and perfection of a
security interest is not intended.
175. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(f) (Supp. 1983). It is anticipated that filing and notation will be
concurrent.Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(e) (ji) (Supp. 1983).
176. Compare Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-930(b) and 34-21-941(d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2)
and 9-312(4) (1972)) according purchase money security interests retroactive priority
over lien creditors and conflicting security interests. Moreover, several state statutes do
not accord retroactive perfection to motor vehicle security interests. See, e.g., N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAw §§ 2101-2135 (McKinney 1970); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 90D,
§§.1-38 (West 1975).
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security interests in motor vehicles. If retroactivity were the intended effect of the five-day provision, presumably its drafters would have utilized
language similar to that used by the Official amendments in the provisions
governing purchase money security interests. It seems probable that the
five-day provision was intended neither to preclude perfection of a security
interest after expiration of the five-day period nor to provide retroactivity.
To the extent that a specific intention existed, it was probably merely to encourage prompt notation of the security interest on the certificate. It
should be so interpreted.
We have already seen that, upon notation of a security interest on a
certificate, the issuing county clerk must also endorse that notation on the
file copy retained in his office. 177 This precaution should avoid later issuance of a duplicate certificate omitting the appropriate notation 17 8 and
also alert interested persons who may choose to inspect the file copy. The
clerk is further instructed that, if the original certificate was issued in
another state, he shall transmit the relevant data to the state officer who
issued the certificate. That officer is, in turn, instructed to endorse the data
on his file copy. Assume that Debtor purchased and obtained a title certificate for his motor vehicle in Utah. He subsequently grants a security interest in the vehicle to a lender in Rock Springs, Wyoming. Are we to infer
that perfection of that security interest requires filing in and certificate
notation by the office of the county clerk in Rock Springs? Is that county
clerk then to notify the issuing Utah officer who shall promptly endorse the
appropriate notation on the file copy in his office? The prescribed Wyoming
procedure cannot be legally binding upon an officer of another state nor
does Utah authorize certificate notation upon the advice received from an
out-of-state functionary. Moreover, this procedure conflicts directly with
and seems unlikely to effect a valid
other Wyoming amendments provisions
179
perfection of the security interest.
Further questions are posed by the provision which fixes the effective
date of financing statement or security agreement at filing. They shall take
effect and be in force, the provision specifies, "from and after the time of
filing and not before . .. .. 80 With respect to conflicts between two
177. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(0 (Supp. 1983).

178. The certificate of title statute does not specifically provide for notation of the security interest on a duplicate certificate. Instead it requires a warning that the certificate "may be
subject to the rights of a person or persons under the original certificate." Wyo. STAT.
§ 31-4-312 (Supp. 1983). One clerk reports that actual notation of the security interest is
made.
179. Generally perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title issued
by another jurisdiction requiring a notation on the certificate is governed by the laws of
the issuing jurisdiction until the title certificate surrendered. See Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-903(b) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(2) (b)(1972)). For discussion of the section
see infra text accompanying notes 243-46. Filing is not necessary or effective to perfect a
security interest in property subject to a certificate of title statute of another jurisdiction
which requires perfection by certificate notation. U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (c) (1972) (WYo. STAT.
§ 34-21-931(c) (iii) (Supp. 1983)).
One clerk reports that she would not note a security interest on an out-of-state title
certificate.
The Colorado certificate of title statute contains an interesting provision which
makes effective in Colorado certificate notation effected there or elsewhere. See COLO.
REV. STAT. § 42-6-131 (1973).
180. WYO.STAT.

§

34-21-931(0 (Supp. 1983).
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secured parties, a curious result may flow from this clause. Assume that
debtor grants First secured party a security interest in a motor vehicle.
First lends and files a financing statement but the security interest is not
yet noted on the certificate of title.181 Second secured party obtains a
security interest in the same vehicle, lends, files and has its security interest noted on the certificate which it returns to Debtor. 18 2 First then has
its security interest noted on the certificate. Which security interest has
priority in the vehicle?
The amendments' general first to file priority provision would accord
First priority because First filed before Second either filed or perfected. 18
The amendments' requirement for compliance with the certificate of title
statute in lieu of filing would accord Second priority because it requires certificate notation and renders filing ineffective and unnecessary. l 4 Under
Wyoming's special motor vehicle perfection provisions, a financing statement or filed security agreement takes effect from and after the time of filing as to other holders of a security interest. No reference to notation appears in this sentence, permitting the inference that priority in this in85
stance, as under the general first to file rule, is governed only by filing.1
This result could be supported by the view that a financing statement
search would have apprised Second of First's security interest and the first
party to file will not thereafter be affected by the knowledge of conflicting
security interests. Yet, in practice, Second probably relies and should be
permitted to rely on the absence of notation on the certificate.
In addition to providing that the financing statement or security agreement takes effect upon filing, the Wyoming motor vehicle perfection provision specifies the persons against whom they take effect: "all creditors,
subsequent purchasers and holders of a security interest in good faith, for
valuable consideration and without notice." It could be mistakenly inferred
from this specification that the filing is not effective against persons who
do not acquire their interest in good faith, for valuable consideration and
without notice. Obviously the interests of these persons cannot be protected when those of persons in a more meritorious position are not. No one
would be likely to dispute this conclusion. The necessity of this quoted
clause is not apparent, however, since other amendments provisions adequately address the effect of filing or perfection upon conflicting
claimants.186 Yet, because of its potential for mischief, we cannot simply
dismiss it as harmless surplusage.
181. Some county clerks will not accept a financing statement covering a motor vehicle unless
accompanied by the title certificate. Others will. In any event, it is doubtful that a filing
by an insistent secured party can be rejected since presentation of a financing statement
and payment of the filing fee constitutes filing. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-952(a) (Supp.
1983) (U.C.C. § 9403(1)(1972)).
182. Nothing requires that the secured party retain possession of a certificate, although conservative practice indicates that it should do so.
183. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(e) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (a) (1972)).
184. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-931(c) (i) and (d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (b) and (4) (1972)).
185. In the usual case arising under the first to file rule, however, filing fulfills the only applicable notice requirement. In the case here considered, an additional notice requirement-certificate notation-remains unfulfilled by First when Second perfects its
security interest. The difference might suggest that, under this provision, both filing and
notation are prerequisites to establish priority.
186. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-930, 34-21-936, 34-21-937, 34-21-941 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§
9-301, 9-307, 9-308, 9-312 (1972)).
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If, upon filing, the financing statement becomes effective as to
creditors, purchasers and secured parties in good faith, for valuable consideration and without knowledge, it can probably be inferred that the unfiled financing statement is ineffective as to the described persons. From
this posture one might then be tempted to draw the further inference that
the unfiled financing statement would be ineffective only as to persons who
meet the good faith, valuable consideration and lack of knowledge criteria.
This conclusion certainly is not required, nor does it appear to be desirable.
With respect to collateral other than motor vehicles, with one exception,
the interests of creditors, purchasers and secured parties are not subordinated to unfiled or unperfected security interests by lack of good faith or
valuable consideration, or by knowledge of the security interest. 8" Only
buyers or transferees not in the ordinary course of business are subordinated by knowledge of an unperfected security interest. 8 8 In every other
respect good faith, 8 9 valuable consideration and knowledge are irrelevant
to the subordination of an unfiled or unperfected security interest. On the
other hand, the provision's reference to creditors is surprising since all
creditors, other than lien creditors (a term defined in the amendments' 90 ),
are subordinate even to unperfected security interests irrespective of good
faith, consideration or lack of knowledge. 19 ' Moreover, the term "valuable
consideration" appears nowhere else in the Code or amendments.
Presumably it is something more than either value or consideration alone,
although something less than fair consideration or fair equivalent.
The possible predication of the effect of an unfiled or unperfected
security interest on other parties' good faith, consideration or knowledge
could produce results with respect to motor vehicles which would differ
from those for all other collateral. Although motor vehicles do differ from
other collateral in some respects, none of the differences warrant these
distinctions in treatment. 192 The statutory provision that filing is effective
against persons acquiring their interests in good faith, for valuable consideration and without knowledge does not logically compel the inference
that interests of those lacking these attributes are subordinate to unfiled or
unperfected security interests. The inference should be rejected.
PROCEEDS

In many secured transactions the parties anticipate that the debtor will
sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral before paying the secured debt.
The most common of these occurs when inventory collateral will be sold or
187. Id.
188. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-930(a) (iii) and (iv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (c) and (d) (1972)).
189. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-122 (1977) (U.C.C. § 1-203 (1962)) does impose an obligation of good
faith in the performance or enforcement of contracts or duties within the U.C.C. "Good
faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." WYO.
STAT. § 34-21-120(xix) (1977) (U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1962)). It seems doubtful that the
obligation could be breached by buying, or obtaining a lien or security interest with
knowledge of an unperfected security interest.

190. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-930(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1972)).
191. WYO. STAT. § 34-21-920 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-201 (1962)). Ordinarily a creditor must obtain
a lien to be entitled to seize the debtor's property. If the security agreement were not effective against a creditor, however, the debtor could transfer collateral in payment of a
debt free from the security interest.
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used in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. In other types of
secured transactions it is not expected that the collateral will be sold or
disposed of, although the debtor could do so in spite of that expectation.
Equipment collateral used to produce goods is a common example of this
type transaction. With respect to each type of transaction, the Code addressed -two questions. First, does the security interest continue in
whatever may be received by the debtor in exchange for the original collateral? Second, does the security interest continue in the collateral after
sale or disposition, so that the secured party may repossess and sell it upon
debtor's default in payment? In general the Code answered the first of
these questions affirmatively with respect to both types of transactions-the security interest continues in identifiable "proceeds" including
collections which the debtor receives. 195 "Proceeds" includes whatever is
received upon any disposition of collateral, or upon disposition of
proceeds. 194 As one might expect, however, the answer to the second question differs depending on the type of transaction. If the parties anticipate
disposition of the collateral (e.g. inventory), or if the secured party
authorizes disposition, the security interest in the collateral disposed of terminates. 95 Otherwise the security interest continues in the collateral (e.g.
equipment) despite disposition.
The amendments effect changes in the Code provisions relating to the
creation of a security interest in proceeds, the perfection of that interest
and the extent of a proceeds security interest upon institution of an insolvency proceeding by or against a debtor. The Code was ambiguous
respecting the necessity for an express claim to proceeds by the secured
party. One provision appeared to require that an express claim be included
in the security agreement 96 and the official form of financing statement
required indication that proceeds were claimed. 197 Another seemed to provide automatic continuation of the security interest in proceeds without
any necessity for an express claim.198 The amendments expressly provide
that, unless specified in the security agreement, no claim to proceeds is required. 199 It is assumed that proceeds are claimed in the normal course,200
placing the burden on the parties to incorporate an exclusion into the
security agreement if desired.
When a security interest did include proceeds, the Code automatically
continued perfection of the proceeds interest if the financing statement
covering the original collateral also covered proceeds. 20 ' In some cases, the
Code's place of filing provisions might have resulted in inadequate notice of
192. Among other distinctive features, motor vehicles can be moved easily and quickly and
have substantial value. They are convenient collateral and are often sold to buyers
unversed in secured transactions laws. These are the basic reasons for requiring title certificates and notation of security interests on those certificates.
193. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962)).
194. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-935(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1962)).
195. See WYo. STAT. §§ 34-21-936(a) and 34-21-935(b) (1977) (U.C.C. §§ 9-307(1) and 9-306(2)

(1962)).
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-922(a) (ii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (b) (1962)).
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-451(c) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-402(3) (1962)).
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962)).
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-922(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-203(3) (1972)).
See U.C.C. § 9-203, Reasons for 1972 Change.
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(c) (1)(1977) (U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (a) (1962)).
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the proceeds interest to third parties. The problem existed under the
Wyoming Code in relation to inventory financing. Frequently a lender who
makes loans to finance a debtor's purchase of inventory obtains a security
interest in both the inventory and the accounts arising upon its sale. To
perfect a security interest in inventory and its proceeds the Wyoming Code
required filing in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the
debtor maintained his principal place of business, if any; otherwise filing
was required in the county in which the debtor resided. 20 2 Security interests in accounts, however, were perfected by filing in the office of the
Secretary of State and in the office of the county clerk for the county in
which the "assignor ' 2 0 3 maintained his principal place of business.2 0 4 As a
result a search for accounts security interests in the Secretary of State's office would not reveal a security interest in the proceeds of a debtor's inventory. To assure protection required a search in the appropriate county
clerk's office, making the provision for filing with the Secretary of State
superfluous.
The amendments seek to provide the notice lacking under the Code.
They limit perfection of a security interest in proceeds, other than identifiable cash proceeds, to a ten-day period unless "[a] filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are collateral in which
a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office or offices where

the financing statement has been filed.

. ..

'205

In Wyoming a security in-

terest in the proceeds of inventory-accounts-cannot be perfected by filing only in the county clerk's office; filing with the Secretary of State is
also required.20 6 Consequently, the proceeds are not "collateral in which a
security interest may be perfected by filing in the [county clerk's office]."
To obtain a perfected security interest in the accounts for more than the
ten-day automatic perfection period, therefore, the inventory financer
must file an additional financing statement in the Secretary of State's office. This additional filing may be made either when the original financing
statement covering inventory is filed with the county
clerk or within ten
207
days after each sale of inventory by the debtor.
A requirement for double filing also exists if a non-resident debtor
owns collateral as to which filing is required in Wyoming. Again, assume
that the debtor owns inventory in Wyoming. If debtor's chief executive office is elsewhere, a security interest in the inventory located in Wyoming is
202. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(a) (iii) (1977). The provision further requires filing in the Wyoming Secretary of State's office if debtor is not a resident of Wyoming. It is unclear
respecting the place of filing if the debtor's principal place of business is in Wyoming but
he resides elsewhere. The provision has no counterpart in the Official Code.
203. The "assignor" of accounts would be a debtor. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (iv) (1977)
(U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (d) (1962)).
204. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-950(a) (i) (1977). If the debtor had no place of business in the state, fil-

ing was probably required in the jurisdiction where its principal place of business was
located. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (1962)).
205. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(c) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (a) (1972)).
206. See supranote 204 and accompanying text. The Wyoming amendments do not change the
place to file requirements.
207. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(c) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (c) (1972)). This method
will virtually always be impractical.
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accounts interest, however, is governed by the law of the state where the
debtor maintains its chief executive office. 209 That law will require filing in
that state. 210 Filing as to inventory in Wyoming will not, therefore, perfect
a security interest in accounts proceeds of that inventory beyond the tenday automatic perfection period. Extension of the perfection for more than
ten days requires a filing
under the law of the state where the chief ex21
ecutive office is located. '
The amendments also specify that, to perfect a security interest in proceeds acquired with cash proceeds, a financing statement must describe the
types of property constituting the proceeds.212 Thus if cash proceeds of the
sale of inventory were to be used to purchase more inventory, the description "inventory" in a financing statement would be sufficient. If cash proceeds of inventory were used to purchase equipment, the description "inventory" would not be sufficient. Relying on this provision one court concluded that a financing statement listing by item furniture inventory on
hand was insufficient to perfect a security interest in furniture inventory
acquired with cash proceeds received upon sale of the listed items. 213 This
result seems questionable in view of the notice function of the financing
statement. The description should have been sufficient at least to signal the
possibility2that
cash proceeds might be utilized to purchase more furniture
14
inventory.
A final proceeds problem under the Code involved the secured party's
right to proceeds of collateral upon the debtor's insolvency. The drafters
attempted to provide a method of determining the secured party's rights
which would avoid the horrors of tracing. The formula subjected commingled funds to the security interest to the extent of cash proceeds received and
commingled with other funds within ten days before institution of the
208. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-903(a) (ii)(Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (b)(1972)). Some confusion
respecting the place to file results from the use of the term "principal place of business,"
a home grown Wyoming term not used in the Official Code. If, as applied to a debtor having its executive office outside Wyoming, "principal place of business" means the principal place in Wyoming, then the financing statement is filed
in the county where that
place is located. If, however, it means the chief executive office, then the financing statement is filed in the Secretary of State's office. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(a) (iii) (1977). The
debtor would not have its principal place of business or its resioence in Wyoming since it
would reside at its chief executive office. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-950(f) (Supp. 1983)
(U.C.C. § 9-401(6) (1972)). The latter reading seems preferable even though it fails to accord different meanings to different terms.
209. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(c) (ii) and (iv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (b)and (d) (1972)).
210. See U.C.C. § 9-401 (1972).
211. Another situation in which a proper filing respecting the original collateral will not extend perfection in the proceeds arises when the proceeds are in the form of instruments.
A security interest in instruments can only be perfected by possession, not by filing.
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-933(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1972)).
212. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(c) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (a)(1972)). "Cash proceeds"
are money, checks, deposit accounts and the like. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(a) (Supp. 1983)
(U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1972)).
213. Goodman v. Schenck, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
214. It seems likely that a description of the collateral simply as "inventory" would have
avoided the problem. Cases are legion which illustrate the perils of describing collateral in
too much detail. In one, a security agreement described the collateral as "assignment of
accounts receivable-$18,000 as of July 1, 1977-Inventory Supplies and Business equipment now and hereafter acquired and proceeds thereof." The court held that this description created a security interest only in the accounts existing as of July 1, 1977. Boulder
Bank and Trust Co. v. U.S., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 774 (N.D. Okla. 1979).
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insolvency proceeding less cash proceeds turned over to the secured party
within that ten-day period. 215 Some argued from this provision that the
secured party's interest in the commingled funds must be reduced by the
amount of all cash proceeds received in the ten-day period, including those
not commingled but turned over to the secured party in kind.2 16 Thus,
where a debtor received and commingled $31,535 of proceeds with other
funds in a general bank account, and also received $31,701 in checks which
were turned over in kind to the secured party, the secured party should
have no security interest in the bank account. The court held that, although
the statute said that, it did not mean that. 217 Instead it required deduction
only of those amounts paid to the secured party from commingled funds.
While employing 21
a8somewhat different formula, the amendments mandate
this latter result.
GOVERNING LAW AND SOME MULTI-STATE TRANSACTIONS

The amendments substantially revise Code provisions respecting the
law which governs transactions affecting more than one jurisdiction. Transactions of this nature occur when collateral is purchased in one jurisdiction
and then moved to another or when a debtor moves from one jurisdiction to
another. Provisions of the Code which governed choice of law respecting
the validity of a security agreement 2 19 and those purporting to state
general choice of law rules 20 have been deleted. The governing provisions
now contain only rules pertaining to perfection of security interests and the
effect of perfection or non-perfection. 221 These provisions have been
restructured according to types of collateral to clarify the statement of applicable rules and their interrelationship.2 22 In general the amendments
provide that "perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection...
are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is when the
last event occurs on which is based the assertion that the security interest
is perfected or unperfected."2 2 Some vital exceptions are made: (1) if
goods are subject to a purchase money security interest and the parties
215.
216.
217.
218.

Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(d) (iv) (B) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii) (1962)).
See In re Security Aluminum Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 47 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
Id.
See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935(d) (iv) (B) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (d) (ii) (1972)). To
determine the amount of the security interest in commingled funds the new formula
reduces all cash proceeds received during the 10-day period by amounts paid over to the
secured party and any other amounts to which the secured party may be entitled under
other parts of the insolvency provisions.
Some questions have arisen respecting the effect of the Federal Bankruptcy Code on
the Code's insolvency provision. It has been contended that the commingling provision effects a preference to the secured party. The preference results from the transfer within
90 days before the bankruptcy petition is filed of debtor's property in which the secured
party might not otherwise have a security interest. This might occur if, within the 10-day
period, debtor deposited proceeds of collateral, then withdrew them, and then deposited
nonproceeds. The provision may accord the secured party a security interest in the nonproceeds, thus creating a preference. It has also been contended that the security interest, which first becomes effective upon insolvency, constitutes a voidable statutory
lien. The contentions and cases are discussed in WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at
1014-17.
219. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-103 (1962)).
220. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-902(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1962))..
221. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103 (1972)).
222. U.C.C. § 9-103, Reasons for 1972 Change, para. 2.
223. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(a) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (b)(1972)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol19/iss2/10

36

Van Baalen: Wyoming Adopts the 1972 Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Art
1984

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9

intend that they will be kept in another jurisdiction, the law of the other
jurisdiction usually governs perfection or non-perfection; 22 4 (2) if goods are
covered by a certificate of title on which the law of the issuing jurisdiction
requires indication of the security interest for perfection, the law of that
jurisdiction governs perfection or nonperfection;22 5 and (3) if the collateral
is accounts, general intangibles or mobile goods, 226 the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located governs perfection or non-perfection.2 27 If,
after the initial perfection, the collateral is moved or the debtor moves to a
new jurisdiction, depending on whether the location of the collateral or the
debtor originally governed perfection, the period for which perfection continues is limited.
The Code specified that a purchase money security interest in collateral
to be kept in this state although acquired elsewhere was governed by this
state's law if the collateral reached this state within thirty days after the
security interest attached.228 Since the security interest could attach before
the debtor took possession of the collateral, any delay in debtor's receipt of
delivery would shorten the thiry-day period for completion of the move to
this state.2 29 Moreover, if delivery to the debtor was delayed for thirty
days, the statutory requirement could not be fulfilled and others could obtain interests in the collateral in the other state which could gain priority
over those of the secured party. The amendments avoid these problems by
beginning 2the
thirty-day period when the debtor receives possession of the
0
collateral.
The amendments' thirty-day provision is not entirely clear respecting
the effect of possible involuntary delay after the debtor receives possession. What if the debtor takes delivery of the collateral in another jurisdiction, but a levy on behalf of a lien creditor prevents him from moving it to
this state within thirty days? Does the security interest prevail over the
levying lien creditor? It would seem that the priorities should be fixed at the
time of- levy,28 ' thereby preserving the security interest. The governing
provision, however, can be read to render perfection retroactively ineffective if the collateral fails to reach this state within thirty days, thereby according priority to the lien creditor. In appraising this possible reading of
the provision, it is significant that the statutory protection of the security
interest is not predicated on notice to third parties in the other jurisdiction.
224. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(a) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (c)(1972)). The goods
must arrive in the jurisdiction where they are to be kept within 30 days after the debtor
receives possession.
225. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(b) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(2) (b) (1972)).
226. "Mobile goods" are those which are mobile and ordinarily used in more than one jurisdiction and not governed by the certificate of title rule referred to in text accompanying note
225. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(c) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (a) (1972)).
227. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(c) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (b) (1972)). Nonpossessory
security
in chattel paper are also governed by this rule. Possessory
security interests
in interests
chattel paper
are governed by the general rule referring to the law of
the urisdiction in which the collateral is located. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(d) (Supp.
1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(4) (1972)).
228. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(C) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1962)).
229. 1f,
as some contend, a debtor cannot have rights in collateral until he receives possession,
the security interest would not attach until then. See, Anzivino, When Does aDebtorHave
Rights in the CollateralUnderArticle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?, 61 MARQ. L.
Rzv. 23 (1977). This would have obviated the problem of delayed delivery.
230. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(a) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (c) (1972)).
231. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-930(a) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b) (1972)).
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Furthermore, the secured party advances credit in reliance specifically on
this collateral while the lien creditor did not. For these reasons, priority of
the security interest should be preserved.2 32 If the levy prevents transportation of the collateral to this state beyond the thirty-day period, however,
preservation of priority over the levying lien creditor would not insulate
the security interest against subordination to others. 2s3
Under the Code, movement of collateral from a jurisdiction in which
the security interest was perfected to another in which it was not usually
required reperfection in the new jurisdiction within four months of the
move. 234 Disagreements arose respecting whether a secured party who
never reperfected retained priority over interests in the collateral acquired
during the four-month period. Some asserted that the security interest enjoyed absolute priority for four months regardless of failure to reperfect.
Others countered that failure to reperfect within four months rendered the
security interest retroactively unperfected from the time when the collateral entered the new jurisdiction. 2 5 The amendments resolve this
dispute partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative, subordinating
the unreperfected security interest to purchasers during the four-month
period, but not subordinating it to liens obtained during that period.23 6 The
amendments also add a similar four-month reperfection requirement with
respect to accounts, general intangibles and mobile goods when the debtor
moves to a new jurisdiction, 2 37 a requirement which had been omitted from
the Code.
Confusion existed under the Code respecting the effect on perfection of
security interests when collateral governed by a certificate of title moved
between jurisdictions. The question arose most frequently with respect to
motor vehicles. The problem may have been complicated by an additional
provision specifying that, when perfection was effected by certificate notation, the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate governed
232.

§ 34-21-903(a) (iv) and (c) (v) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (d) and (3) (e)
(1972)). Dealing with other situations, the drafters clearly prescribed retroactive ineffectiveness for failure to file in another jurisdiction when the collateral or debtor moves. The
inference is that, having made this sort of provision there and not here, it is not intended
here.
Cf.WYO.STAT.

233. Recognizing that delay in reaching the destination jurisdiction may disappoint expectations that its law will govern perfection continuously, the draf rs recommend the
precaution of filing in both jurisdictions. U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 3 (1972).

234. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(c) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1962)). The provision strikes a compromise between the original secured party and persons acquiring interests in the collateral in the new jurisdiction. Admittedly the compromise may produce somewhat arbitrary results. The original secured party must discover the move and reperfect within
four months or lose priority over intervening purchasers. After four months persons in
the new jurisdiction are protected against security interests from the orinai jurisdiction

which the secured party has not reperfected. Interests in the collateral acquired in the
however,
are subordinate to an original
the four-month
period,
new
jurisdiction
within
that period.
security
interest within
subsequently
reperfected
235. See, e.g., Arrow Ford, Inc. v. Western Landscape Construction Co., 23 Ariz. App. 281,
532 P.2d 553 (1975) (nreperfected security interest retroactively ineffective); First National Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 160, 225 A.2d 162 (1966) (security
over 4,buyer
within four months although never reperfected). See also
interest
at 41.
Draft No.has2,priority
supra note
236. See WYo. STAT. § 34-21-903(a) (iv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(1) (d) (1972)).
"Purchaser" includes both buyers and secured parties. Wro. STAT. § 34-21-120(xxxii)
and (xxxiii) (1977) (U.C.C. § 1-201(32) and (33) (1962)).
237. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(c) (v) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (e) (1972)).
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perfection. 23 8 Relying upon this provision, some courts held that perfection
continued without limitation in the new jurisdiction. 3 9 Others ignored the
provision altogether in favor of the four-month reperfection
requirement. 240 Still others held that the four-month priority rule governed
even if the new jurisdiction issued a certificate without security interest
notation within the four-month period.2 41 The problems were further complicated by movement between certificate and noncertificate
jurisdictions.242
The amendments treat separately security interests perfected by notation on a certificate of title. 243 When the collateral moves to a new jurisdiction, the security interest perfected by certificate notation in the original
jurisdiction remains perfected for four months. If the collateral has not
been reregistered in the new jurisdiction within the four-month period, the
perfection continues until it is reregistered. In no event, however, does
perfection continue beyond surrender of the original title certificate. 244 If a
dishonest debtor obtains a duplicate certificate without notation of the
security interest, he could surrender that certificate in the new jurisdiction.
Since surrender of a duplicate certificate on which the security interest is
not noted does not constitute surrender of the certificate,2 45 however, the
secured party who retains the
original certificate is accorded a minimum of
246
four months to reperfect.
A second amendments provision governing certificate of title collateral
creates an exception from the continued perfection provisions just discussed.2 47 It is designed to protect nonprofessional buyers who rely upon a certificate issued by the new jurisdiction which does not reveal the security interest. Unless the new certificate shows that the goods might be subject to
an undisclosed security interest, "the security interest is subordinate to the
rights of [a nonprofessional buyer] to the extent that he gives value and
receives delivery of the goods after issuance of a certificate and without
238. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(d) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-103(4) (1962)).
239. See, e.g., In re White, 266 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
240. See, e.g., Arrow Ford v. Western Landscape Construction Co., 23 Ariz. App. 281, 532
P.2d 553 (1975).
241. See, e.g., First National Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162
(1966).
242. J. WHIrrE & R. SUMMERS,HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1972), discusses the problems at section 23-21.
243. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(2) (1972)).
244. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-903(b) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C.§ 9-103(2) (b)(1972)).
245. See U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 4(c) (1972). Conservative practice dictates that the secured
party retain the original certificate of title to preclude its surrender in another jurisdiction. If the original certificate is surrendered in exchange for a Wyoming certificate, the
county clerk must note on the Wyoming certificate any security interest shown on the
surrendered one. Wyo. STAT. §§ 31-4-304(b) and 31-4-308(b) (iii) (Supp. 1983).
246. The secured party could file a financing statement if he knew the county in which to file
(WYo. STAT. § 34-21-951(b) (i)(Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-402(2) (a) (1972)), but no provision
permits him to require notation of his security interest on a certificate issued by the
Wyoming county clerk. If a debtor manages to obtain a clean certificate in another
jurisdiction, he can have a clean Wyoming certificate issued also. Most security
agreements provide that removing this sort of collateral from the jurisdiction constitutes
a default. This enables the secured party to repossess the collateral if he can find it,
thereby reperfecting by possession. See U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 4(e) (1972).
247. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-903(b) (iv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-103(2) (d) (1972)).
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knowledge of the security interest."2 4 8 The choice of the words "the security interest is subordinate" and "to the extent that he gives value" seems
unfortunate. A simple promise to pay, without any out-of-pocket payment,
would constitute "value. ' 249 Surely the putative buyer who has given
nothing more than a promise when the secured party appears upon the
scene should not prevail over the latter's right to repossess and sell the collateral. Perhaps the problem is unlikely to arise because the provision also
requires that the buyer must have received delivery. Instances in which the
buyer will receive delivery before payment, or at least part payment, of the
agreed price will be rare.
Despite the Code's general definition of "value," the phrase "to the extent that [the buyer] gives value" suggests that "value" here means payment, not merely a promise to pay.2 50 Although this seems consistent with
a legitimate effort to protect innocent buyers who have paid their money in
reliance on their own state's certificate of title, it presents some
troublesome questions. What if the buyer has not yet paid the whole purchase price when the secured party surfaces? Or, alternatively, what if,
because of the dishonest debtor's eagerness to sell, the buyer has made a
very good deal? In either of these circumstances, if the law permits, the
secured party may elect to repossess and sell the collateral, reimburse the
buyer's out-of-pocket payments from the proceeds and hope to recover a
portion of his unpaid loan. Does the provision authorize this result? That it
speaks in terms of the security interest being "subordinate ...to the extent that [the buyer] gives value," rather than in terms of the buyer taking
free from the security interest, implies that it does.2 6 1A subordinate security interest is entitled to proceeds of collateral remaining after the prior interest is paid. 25 2 The provision further implies that the security interest
takes priority over buyer's ownership interest to the extent that he has not
given value.
If the amendments protects the nonprofessional buyer's out-of-pocket
expenses only, the buyer has not given value to the extent that promised
payments are yet to be made. A secured party might also assert, although
perhaps less convincingly, that the buyer has not given value to the extent
that the agreed purchase price falls short of a reasonable market value of
the vehicle. Having aired the arguments, however, it is hard to suppress a
suspicion that this is not really what the drafters intended, in spite of their
ill-chosen words. The provision seems motivated by a desire to protect the
innocent, nonprofessional buyer against repossessing secured parties. To
effectuate this purpose, perhaps the words "to the extent that he gives
248. Id. Some certificate of title laws require that certificates bear a warning regarding undisclosed security interests in vehicles originally titled out-of-state. After four months
this warning may be removed. This procedure obviates the problems addressed by the
quoted provision. U.C.C. § 9-103, Comment 4(e) (1972).
249. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-120(xliv) (D) (1977) (U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (d) (1962)).

250. Emphasis supplied. All of the general definitions are subject to modification if "the con-

text otherwise requires,... " U.C.C. § 1-201 (1962) (WYo. STAT. § 34-21-120(a) (1977)).
251. Cf WYO. STAT. § 34-21-936(a) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972)). (Buyer in ordinary
course of business "takes free" of a security interest created by his seller). But cf.U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1) (c) and (d) (1972) (WYO. STAT. § 34-21-930 (a) (iii) and (iv)
(Supp. 198.3))
(unperfected security interest "subordinate to" transferees and buyers not in the ordinary course of business).
252. Cf.WYO.STAT. § 34-21-963(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1972)) (secured party must pay
excess proceeds of disposition of collateral to subordinate secured party).
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value" should be read as "if he gives value." Any value given preceding
knowledge of a security interest should then suffice to prevent repossession; bargain buyers would also be protected because this reading would
make the 25relationship
between the agreed price and market value
3
irrelevant.
FIxTUREs

The Code and amendments govern security interests in personal property only and, in general, are not intended to affect interests in real
estate. The one exception to this general approach arose under the Code
when collateral subject to a security interest became fixtures. 26 4 For
example, the furnace installed in a building to furnish heat may be a fixture. If it is, conflicting claims to the furnace might be made by a secured
party and a person holding an interest in the real estate. Ordinarily the real
estate claimants would be a mortgagee, a buyer, a judgment creditor
holding a real estate lien or an owner whose tenant may subject to a security interest property located or to be located in the premises.
Two disputes may arise between the secured party and a person
predicating his claim to the furnace upon a real estate interest. First, is the
furnace a fixture or isn't it? If it is not a fixture, then no conflict exists
because no claim to it arises by virtue of holding a real estate interest. If
the furnace is a fixture, the second issue must be faced-does the security
interest or the real estate interest have priority? The Code left resolution of
the first issue to local, non-Code law. 256 If, under that law, the furnace constituted a fixture, however, the Code governed priority conflicts between
security interest and real estate interest.2 56 Generally, if a security interest
attached before the furnace became a fixture, it took priority over all real
estate interests except a few which were acquired between creation and
perfection of the security interest. If the security interest attached after
the furnace became a fixture, it also took priority over all subsequently acquired real estate interests except a few acquired between its creation and
perfection. It was subordinate, however, to all real estate interests existing
when the security interest was created, unless they consented or disclaimed an interest in the furnace. In response to substantial criticism, the
amendments completely revise the Code's fixture provisions.
The fixture provisions recognize three categories of property-pure
personalty, which is not part of real estate; pure real estate, which has no
personalty characteristics for finance purposes, and fixtures, which occupy
a legal status somewhere between the Qther two categories. 25 7 While the
statute deferred to local real estate law to determine what constituted a
253. In a case in which less than the entire purchase price has been paid by the innocent buyer,
he might be required to pay the balance to the secured party. If the solution recommended for bargain purchases is unpalatable, possibly a court should determine a "fair" price,
giving buyer the option to pay the secured party any excess over the bargain price or permit repossession upon return of amounts already paid.
254. See Wvo. STAT. § 34-21-942 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-313 (1962)).
255. WYO.STAT. § 34-21-942(a) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-313(1) (1962)).
256. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(b) and (d) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-313(2)-(4) (1962)).
257. See U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 3 (1972).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

41

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

fixture, some states did not recognize fixtures as occupying an independent, intermediate position between personaly and realty. 25 The amendments obviate the necessity for local law categorization of some goods as
"fixtures" by defining this term to include all goods "when they become so
related to particular
real estate that an interest in them arises under real
estate law. ' ' 259
Perhaps the most serious substantive flaw in the Code's fixture provisions surfaced in respect to their allocation of priority between security interests and construction mortgages. The fixture provisions accorded priority over all real estate interests (including construction mortgages) to any
security interest which attached before the goods became fixtures, except
certain interests subsequently acquired without knowledge and before
perfection of the security interest.28 0 An owner or contractor who ran short
of construction funds might finance the acquisition of fixtures by granting
a purchase money security interest to the financer. When perfected that interest took priority over the construction mortgage.2 6 1 This result was
criticized on the ground that it frustrated the mortgagee's reasonable ex26 2
pectation of a first mortgage on a complete and functioning building.
The amendments expressly reverse this result, according priority over
security interests to the construction mortgage and any mortgage given to

refinance

it.26s

The Code provision granting priority to security interests attaching
before goods became fixtures also enabled a secured party to obtain priority overboth owners and mortgagees even though his debtor had no interest
in the real estate. If a contractor granted a security interest to finance the
purchase of a fixture, the Code accorded that security interest priority over
real estate interests in the building in which the fixture was installed. This
result flowed from the grant of priority to any security interest attaching
to goods before they became fixtures, without specification of who could
create the interest. 264 Again the amendments came to the rescue, limiting
either has an interest
priority to security interests created by a debtor who
265
of record in or is in possession of the real estate.
Two interpretive questions also marred the Code's fixture provisions.
First, the provisions denied security interests priority over certain real
258. Schroeder, Revision of the U.C.C. inArizona-SecurityInterestsin Fixtures, 1975 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 289, 323.
259. WYO.STAT. § 34-21-942(a) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(1) (a) (1972)).
260. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-313(2) (1962)). The excepted interests were
those of a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate, a creditor
holding a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by judicial proceedings and a
creditor holding a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the extent that he
made future advances. These persons obtained priority, however, only if they acted
without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected. Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-942(d) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1962)).
261. Even the unperfected security interest enjoyed priority over prior advances on the rationale that the holder of a prior interest could not have relied on the fixture when that interest was acquired.
262. See, e.g., Coogan, The New Article 9, 86 HARv.L. REv.477, 498-99 (1973).
263. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(f) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972)).
264. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-313(2) (1962)). The owner would take
free from the security interest created by the contractor, however, if the latter were considered to be in the business of selling goods of that kind. See WYo. STAT. § 34-21-936(a)
(1977) (U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1962)).
(Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (a) (1972)).
265. See Wyo STAT. § 34-21-942(d) (i)
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estate interests created subsequently to the security interest but before its
perfection.266 It was silent, however, on whether the subsequently created
interests protected were those created subsequently to attachment of the
security interest or subsequently to installation of the goods in the real
estate. Attachment would ordinarily occur when the goods were purchased
or delivered, installation could be substantially later. The latter interpretation of "subsequently" seemed preferable since the holder of the real estate
interest would be unlikely to rely on the goods before they were installed as
fixtures. 26 7 The amendments solve the problem by abandoning this distinction. They accord priority in all cases to the purchase money security interest perfected by fixture filing either before the goods became fixtures or
within ten days thereafter.26 8 It is immaterial whether the real estate interest is created prior to or subsequently to installation of the fixtures.
The second interpretive question lurking in the Code's fixture provisions pertained to a conflict between the unperfected fixture security interest created by a tenant and the interest of the real estate owner or his
mortgagee. If the tenant had no right as against the owner to remove the
fixture at the end of the lease, the rights of a secured party, whether
perfected or unperfected, were subordinate to those of the owner or mortgagee. 269 Furthermore, one might have inferred from the Code fixture provisions that, even if the tenant could remove fixtures, the removal rights of
an unperfected security interest were subordinate to the rights of the
owner or mortgagee. While these provisions did not expressly address the
permit removal by the holder of2 7 the
issue, the preferable result would
1
270
unperfected security interest. The amendments specify this result.
The amendments also add some provisions not contained in the Code.
While continuing the priority of a security interest perfected before a real
estate interest is recorded, the amendments add that the security interest
must also have priority over any predecessor in title of the real estate interest in question.2 72 This negates the possibility that a security interest
subordinate to an owner or mortgagee could become superior to a purchaser from that owner or to an assignee of that mortgagee.
Another added provision accords priority over all real estate interests
to security interests in fixtures which are readily removable factory or office machines or readily removable replacements of domestic appliances
which are consumer goods. 78 These security interests must be perfected
266. See supra note 260.

267. G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 30.6 (1965).
268. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(d) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (a) (1972)). The adoption
of a 10-day grace period for perfection makes this provision logically consistent with the
amendments' other purchase money security provisions. Compare WYO. STAT. §§
34-21-930(b) and 34-21-941(d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2) and 9-312(4) (1972)).

269.
270.
271.
272.

Wyoming did not increase this 10-day period to 20 days when it increased the period
governing the other purchase money security interest filing requirements.
See Kripke, Fiztures Under the Unifo rn Commercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 66-67
(1964). This seems to make superfluous any fixture filing requirement for security interests in a tenant's fixtures.
Id.
WYo. STAT. § 34-21-942(e) (i) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(5) (b)(1972)).
Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(d) (ii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (b)(1972)).

273. WYo. STAT. § 34-21-942(d) (iii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (c) (1972)). Although the

provision is of academic interest, it seems unlikely that goods of this type would constitute fixtures in Wyoming.
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before the goods become fixtures, 27 4 but a fixture filing is not required; any
method of perfection will suffice. In most jurisdictions goods of this sort
would probably not be sufficiently related to real estate to be classified as
fixtures and, therefore, not subject to real estate interests in any event. If
they are, however, the secured party is relieved from compliance with the
more burdensome requirements applicable to fixture financing statements
and their filing.27 5 The burden is placed in the mortgagee to determine the
existence of security interests from the ordinary financing statement file
and, if he claims an interest in this type of goods, to perfect by filing an ordinary financing statement. Note also that the priority of security interests
in appliances is limited to replacements of domestic appliances which are
consumer goods. This rather narrow classification excludes original appliances in new buildings (such as27 apartment
buildings) which might be in6
cluded in construction financing.
A third addition to the fixture provisions made by the amendments accords priority to any security interest against "a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was
perfected by any method permitted by [Article 9]."1277 The addition clarifies
that fixture filing is not required for priority in fictures over lien creditors.
These creditors are not likely to search the real estate recordings or to rely
upon specific property. 278 This provision raises some question respecting
the vulnerability in bankruptcy of a fixture security interest perfected by a
method other than fixture filing. For some purposes the Bankruptcy Code
grants a bankruptcy trustee the rights that a bona fide purchaser of real
property from the debtor could assert over holders of conflicting
interests. 2 9 The fixture security interest perfected by ordinary filing
rather than by fixture filing would take priority over a lien creditor but
would not take priority over a purchaser. It has been suggested that this
Bankruptcy Code provision2 0is aimed at a different problem and should not
apply to fixture priorities.
The content and filing of a financing statement to perfect security interests in a fixture have also been a source of some problems. These have
arisen primarily from lack of adequate requirements for filing in relevant
real estate records, for identification of the related real estate in the financ274. For this reason, they are likely to be purchase money security interests which could be
perfected and gain priority under section 9-313(4) (a). Section 9-313(4) (c)accords priority
over construction mortgages, however, while section 9-313(4) (a) does not. Wyo. STAT. §
34-21-942(f) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(6) (1972)). The drafters conclude that factory
and office machines "are not always financed as part a construction mortgage." U.C.C. §
9-313, Comment 4(d) (1972).
275. These require a description of the real estate, the name of the record owner and must be
filed and indexed in the real estate records. Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-950(a) (ii) (1977) and
34-21-951(e) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-401(1) (a) and 9-402 (5) (1972)).
276. See U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 4(d) (1972).
277. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-942(d) (iv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (d)(1972)).
278. See U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 4(c) (1972).
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (3) (1982).
280. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supranote 16, at 1062. The problem at which section 544(a) (3)
is aimed concerns real estate recording statutes, like Wyoming's, which render unrecorded conveyances ineffective against subsequent purchasers in good faith, but not against
lien creditors. Compare WYO.STAT. § 34-1-120 (1977). In states having these statutes an
unrecorded mortgage would be invulnerable to the attack of a trustee asserting only his
lien creditor rights. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1) (1982).
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ing statement, and for indexing of the financing statement. 281 Filing in the
real estate records is necessary to provide notice of the security interest to
persons who have or may acquire some interest in the real estate. An adequate description of the real estate enables those persons to identify the
real estate where the fixture is located. Further, if the debtor has no interest in the real estate, persons searching the record are unlikely to find
the filing unless it is indexed under the owner's name. 282 The amendments
require that a fixture filing must recite that it is to be filed in the real estate
records. It must also contain a description of the real estate sufficient to
constitute a constructive notice under the state's mortgage law and, if the
debtor has no interest in the real estate, must contain the name of the
record owner.2 88 Fixture filings must also be indexed under the names of
the debtor and any owner of record shown in the financing statement in the
and under the
same way as if both debtor and owner were mortgagors,
28 4
name of the secured party as if he were a mortgagee.

SOME OTHER CHANGES

Some other, miscellaneous changes effected by the amendments
deserve note. The provisions of the Code excluding from the application of
Article 9 certain types of transactions are revised in several respects; the
revisions seem self explanatory. They include the following revisions and a
few others: An exclusion of equipment trusts covering railway rolling stock
is deleted since these are essentially similar to other commercial secured
transactions.2 8 6 They should, therefore, be governed by the amendments.
An express exclusion of transfers by a government or governmental unit is
inserted for clarity.28 6 Transactions involving the transfer of a single account in whole or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness are excluded from the Article's application.28 7 Although transfers of insurance
policies or claims thereunder are excluded from the Article's application,
claims to policies as proceeds of collateral as well as the priorities of conflic288
ting claims to those proceeds are expressly excepted from the exclusion.
Although rights represented by judgments are excluded, a judgment on a
right to payment which was collateral (such as an account) is expressly excepted from the exclusion.289 Transfers of any interest in a deposit account
are expressly excluded, but deposit accounts representing proceeds of colconflicts in those proceeds are expressly excepted from
lateral and priority
2 90
the exclusion.
281. See U.C.C. § 9-402, Reasons for 1972 Change.
282. Id.
283. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-951(e) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1972)). The requirements of
this subsection also apply when the collateral is timber to be cut, minerals or the like, or
accounts resulting from sale of minerals or the like at wellhead or minehead.
284. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-952(g) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-403(7) (1972)). The requirements of

this subsection also apply when the collateral is timber to be cut, minerals or the like, or
accounts resulting from sale of minerals or the like at wellhead or minehead.
285. See U.C.C. § 9-104, Reasons for 1972 Change.
286. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-904(a)(v)(Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-104(e) (1972) and Reasons for 1972
287.
288.
289.
290.

Change).
Wyo. STAT.
Wyo. STAT.
Wyo. STAT.
Wyo. STAT.

§
§
§
§

34-21-904(a)
34-21-904(a)
34-21-904(a)
34-21-904(a)

(vi) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1972)).
(vii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-104(g) (1972)).
(viii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-104(h) (1972)).
(xii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-1040) (1972)).
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Several revisions appear in the defninitions of terms used in the Article. These include the following revisions and some others. The definition of
"document" is expanded to include receipts issued by certain persons even
though they are not warehousemen. 291 This addition clarifies that these
receipts are governed by the optional perfection provisions, permitting
perfection of security interests either by filing or by possession. 292 The
primary purpose of this addition is to include as "documents" receipts
issued by grain dealers who are not warehousemen.2 93 The definition of
goods is amended to add thereto "standing timber which is to be cut and
removed under a conveyance or contract for sale" and to exclude
therefrom "minerals or the like (including oil and gas) before
extraction. ' 294 The following definition of the new term "pursuant to commitment" is added: "An advance is made 'pursuant to commitment' if the
secured party has bound himself to make it, whether or not a subsequent
event of default or other event not within his control has relieved or may
relieve him from his obligation. 2 9 6 In view of this definition it is possible
that an advance may be made "pursuant to commitment" and, therefore,
entitled to priority even if intervening events have discharged the secured
obligation to make it. The new term "transmitting utiliparty's contractual 296
ty" is also defined.
The Code distinguished between "accounts" and "contract rights," the
latter term designating the incipient account before obligee had
performed. 297 Since the term caused several difficulties and the distinction
between the two terms was not necessary, 298 it has been deleted and "accounts" redefined to include obligations not yet earned by the obligee's performance. Corresponding deletions have been made in numerous sections
throughout the Article. A new provision has been added which requires
some consignors to notify secured parties that they are delivering goods to
the consignee on consignment. 299 The provision applies to any consignor
who is required to file a financing statement to insulate his goods against
claims by the consignee's creditors. 00 He must file and give written notice
291. WYO.STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (vi) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (f) (1972) and Reasons for
1972 Change). The subsection became somewhat garbled in the process of being
transplanted from the Official Code to the Wyoming Code.
292. See Wyo. STAT. 9§ 34-21-933 and 34-21-934 (1977 & Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-304 and
9-305 (1972)).
293. Draft No. 2, supra note 4, at 47.
294. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (viii) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (h)(1972)).
295. WYo. STAT. 9 34-21-905(a) (xi) (Supp. 1983)(U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(k)(1972)). The new term is
used in determining the priority of future advances over intervening lien creditors (Wyo.
STAT. § 34-21-930(d) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-301(4) (1972)), buyers (WYo. STAT. §
34-21-936(c) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1972)) and security interests (WYo. STAT. §
34-21-941(g) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1972)).
296. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-905(a) (xiv) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (n) (1972)). Security
interests in collateral owned by a transmitting utility are discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 111-14.
297. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-906 (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962)).
298. See U.C.C. § 9-106, Reasons for 1972 Change.
299. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-914 (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-114 (1972)).
300. A consignor's goods delivered on sale or return are subject to claims of the consignee's
creditors unless the consignor complies with an applicable sign law, establishes that the
consignee is generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the
goods of others, or files a financing statement. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-243(c) (1977) (U.C.C.
§ 2-326(3) (1962)).
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of intended consignment deliveries to persons who, prior to his filing, have
filed a financing statement covering the same types of goods. 0 1
The Code provisions governing attachment and enforceability of
security interests have been rewritten.302 These provisions are combined to
avoid the former anomaly that a security interest could be attached but not
enforceable. 0 8 A Code provision specifying when a debtor acquired rights
in crops, young of livestock, fish, mineral, timber, contract rights and accounts has been deleted as unnecessary and confusing.30 4 Another, limiting
to one year acquisition of a security interest in crops under an afteracquired property clause, has also been deleted as ineffective and productive of unnecessary paperwork. 0 5
Code provisions governing notice by the secured party of proposed sale
of collateral or proposed retention of the collateral in full satisfaction of the
debt, and also provisions governing rights to object to a proposed retention
of the collateral, have been revised. 06 The secured party need no longer
notify a debtor of a proposed sale or of intent to retain the collateral when,
after default, the debtor signs a statement renouncing or modifying his
right to notice.807 Under the Code the foreclosing secured party was required to give notice of the proposed sale or retention of the collateral to
the debtor and all other secured parties holding a security interest in the
same collateral who had filed a financing statement indexed in the debtor's
name or who the foreclosing secured party knew to have a security interest
in the collateral.8 08 To reduce this unwarranted burden on the foreclosing
secured party and to avoid disputes over his possible knowledge of unfiled
security interests,8° 9 the amendments reduce his responsibility to notifying
the debtor and other secured parties
who have notified the secured party of
10
their interest in the collateral.3
The Official amendments contain a new Article 11 consisting of eight
sections which govern questions of transition from the Official Code to the
Official amendments. 81 ' The sections address primarily questions concerning which law governs transactions initiated prior to the effective date of
the Official amendments and continuing thereafter. Among others, they
resolve questions concerning how changes in the place to file affect con301. The provision is substantially the same as the one requiring that purchase money inventory financers notify other inventory secured parties. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-941(c)
(Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1972)).
302. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-922 and 34-21-923 (1977) (U.C.C. §§ 9-203 and 9-204 (1962)).
303. See Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-922(a) and (b) (Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. § 9-203(1) and (2) (1972) and
Reasons for 1972 Change).
304. Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-923(b) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1962) and Reasons for 1972

Change).
305. Wyo.

STAT.

§ 34-21-923(d) (i) (1977) (U.C.C. § 9-204(4) (a) (1962) and Reasons for 1972

Change).
306. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-963(c) and 34-21-964(b) (1977) (U.C.C. §§ 9-504(3) and 9-505(2)
(1962)).
307. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-21-963(c) and 34-21-964(b) (Cum. Supp. 1983) (U.C.C. §§ 9-504(3)
and 9-605(2) (1972)).
308. See supra note 306.
309. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504 and 9-505, Reasons for 1972 Change.
310. See upra note 307. Although the change will require every other secured party wishing
to receive notice to notify the forecloser, few will actually do so. The interest of most will
be junior to the forecloser and valueless. See U.C.C. § 9-504, Reasons for 1972 Change.
311. See U.C.C. §§ 11-101 to 11-108 (1972).
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tinued perfection.3 12 A general provision also instructs that amendments
are declaratory of the meaning of the Code unless a change has clearly been
made. 813 The Wyoming Legislature did not adopt any of the transition provisions. It remains to be seen how our courts will resolve transition problems and to what extent, if any, they will be influenced by the Official
amendments' transition provisions.

CONCLUSION

The amendments effect rather substantial changes in the text of Article 9 of the Code. Most of these changes respond to interpretive questions
revealed by decided cases or by commentaries discussing the Official
Code's provisions. Some provisions, however, were found to mandate
undesirable results. These have been rectified by changes in the substantive effect of the offending provisions.
In regard to motor vehicle security interests, confusion is engendered
by the Wyoming amendments. First they adopt the Official amendments'
recommendation, referring to the Wyoming certificate of title statute as
the exclusive law governing the method of perfecting these security interests. This reference would probably have been sufficient if the certificate of title statute had also been amended to provide for security interest notation on outstanding title certificates. Instead the Wyoming
amendments carry forward independent Wyoming Code provisions
purporting to govern perfection of motor vehicle security interests. These
require both title certificate notation and financing statement filing.
Moreover, the unique Wyoming amendments provisions themselves raise
several interpretive questions. 1 4 Statutory revision to cure the uncertainties created by Wyoming's treatment of this subject would be desirable.
With the exception of the motor vehicle situation just mentioned, the
Legislature's adoption of the Wyoming amendments is gratifying.
Although some questions still remain and continued application of the
statute will undoubtedly disclose additional ones, the amendments have
both clarified and improved Wyoming's law of personal property secured
transactions.

312. The Wyoming amendments do not change the basic place to file requirements. In some
circumstances, however, they will require an additional filing to perfect as to proceeds.
See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
313. U.C.C. § 11-108 (1972).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 170-92.
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